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ABSTRACT 
 
In the future the number of the disabled drivers requiring a special evaluation of their 
driving ability will increase due to the ageing population, as well as the progress of 
adaptive technology. This places pressure on the development of the driving evaluation 
system.  
 Despite quite intensive research there is still no consensus concerning what is the 
factual situation  in a driver evaluation (methodology), which measures should be 
included in an evaluation (methods), and how an evaluation has to be carried out 
(practise). In order to find answers to these questions we carried out empirical studies, 
and simultaneously  elaborated upon a conceptual model for driving and a driving 
evaluation.  
 The findings of empirical studies  can be condensed into the following points:  
1) A driving ability defined by the on-road driving test is associated with different  
laboratory measures depending on the study groups. Faults in the laboratory tests 
predicted faults in the on-road driving test in the novice group, whereas slowness in the 
laboratory predicted driving faults in the experienced drivers group. 2) The Parkinson 
study clearly showed that even an experienced clinician cannot reliably accomplish an 
evaluation of  a disabled person’s driving ability without collaboration with other 
specialists. 3) The main finding of the stroke study was that the use of a 
multidisciplinary team as a source of information harmonises the specialists’ 
evaluations. 4) The patient studies demonstrated that the disabled persons themselves, 
as well as their spouses, are as a rule not reliable evaluators. 5) From the safety point of 
view, perceptible operations with the control devices are not crucial, but correct mental 
actions which the driver carries out with the help of the control devices are of greatest 
importance.  6) Personality factors including higher-order needs and motives, attitudes 
and a degree of self-awareness, particularly a sense of illness, are decisive when 
evaluating a disabled person’s driving ability. Personality is also the main source of 
resources concerning compensations for lower-order physical deficiencies and 
restrictions. 
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 From work with the conceptual model we drew the following methodological 
conclusions: First, the driver has to be considered as a holistic subject of the activity, as 
a multilevel hierarchically organised system of an organism, a temperament, an 
individuality, and a personality where the personality is the leading subsystem from the 
standpoint of safety. Second, driving as a human form of a sociopractical activity, is 
also a hierarchically organised dynamic system. Third, in an evaluation of driving 
ability it is a question of matching these two hierarchically organised structures: a 
subject of an activity and a proper activity. Fourth, an evaluation has to be person 
centred but not disease-, function- or method centred.  
 On the basis of our study a multidisciplinary team (practitioner, driving school 
teacher, psychologist, occupational therapist) is recommended for use in demanding 
driver evaluations. Primary in a driver’s evaluations is a coherent conceptual model 
while concrete methods of evaluations may vary. However, the on-road test  must 
always be performed if possible. 
 
Keywords: Driving, driving ability, subject of activity,  activity theory 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Tulevaisuudessa ajokyvyn erityistutkimusta vaativien toimintarajoitteisten henkilöiden määrä 
tulee kasvaamaan väestön vanhenemisen ja apuvälineteknologian kehittymisen myötä. Tämä 
luo paineita ajokykyarvioinnin kehittämiselle.  
  Huolimatta varsin intensiivisestä tutkimuksesta edelleenkään ei ole olemassa yhteistä 
näkemystä siitä, mistä ajokykyarvioinneissa on kysymys (metodologia), mitä menetelmiä ja 
mittoja arvioinneissa tulisi käyttää (metodit) ja miten arviointi tulisi suorittaa (käytäntö). 
Vastausta näihin kysymyksiin haettiin empiirisillä tutkimuksilla ja kehittämällä 
samanaikaisesti, empiiristä tutkimusta hyödyntäen, ajotoiminnan ja ajokyvyn arvioinnin 
käsitteellinen malli. Malli luotiin psykologisen toiminnan teorian pohjalta.  
 Empiiristen tutkimusten löydökset voidaan kiteyttää seuraaviin kohtiin: 1) Ajokokeella 
määritelty ajokykyisyys on yhteydessä ryhmästä riippuen erilaisiin laboratoriomittoihin. 
Kokemattomilla virheet laboratoriossa ennustivat virheitä ajokokeessa, kun taas kokeneilla 
hitaus laboratoriossa ennusti virheitä ajokokeessa. 2) Parkinson-tutkimus osoitti selkeästi, 
että kokenutkaan kliinikko ei kykene vajakuntoisen henkilön ajokykyä luotettavasti 
arvioimaan tekemättä yhteistyötä muiden asiantuntijoiden  kanssa. 3) 
Aivoinfarktitutkimuksen keskeinen löydös oli, että moniammatillisen tiimin käyttö 
informaatiolähteenä harmonisoi eri asiantuntijoiden  arvioinnit. 4) Potilastutkimukset 
osoittivat, etteivät potilaat itse eivätkä heidän puolisonsa kykene luotettavasti ajokykyä 
arvioimaan. 5) Turvallisuuden kannalta hallintalaitteilla suoritetut operaatiot eivät ole 
ratkaisevia, vaan keskeisessä asemassa ovat henkiset toiminnot, jotka  kuljettaja toteuttaa 
hallintalaitteiden avulla. 6) Persoonallisuustekijät mukaan lukien korkeamman tason tarpeet,  
motiivit, asenteet ja itsetiedostuksen aste, etenkin sairauden tunne, ovat keskeisiä 
arvioitaessa toimintarajoitteisten henkilöiden ajokykyä. Persoonallisuus on myöskin tärkein 
kompensaatiolähde alemman asteen fyysisille rajoitteille.  
 Ajotoiminnan ja ajokyvyn arvioinnin mallintamisessa tultiin seuraavanlaisiin 
metodologisiin johtopäätöksiin: Ensinnäkin kuljettaja, toiminnan subjekti, on nähtävä 
monitasoisena hierarkisesti organisoituneena organismin, temperamentin, individin ja 
persoonallisuuden systeeminä persoonallisuuden ollessa turvallisuusnäkökulmasta katsottuna 
johtava tarkastelutaso. Toiseksi, autoilu inhimillisenä yhteiskunnallis-konkreettisena 
toimintamuotona on myöskin hierakisesti järjestäytynyt dynaaminen systeemi. Ajokyvyn 
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arvioinnissa on kysymys näiden kahden hierakisesti järjestäytyneen kompleksisen systeemin, 
toiminnan subjektin ja itse toiminnan, yhteensovittamisesta. Kolmanneksi, arvioinnin on 
oltava persoonalähtöinen eikä sairaus-, funktio- tai menetelmälähtöinen.  
 Tutkimuksemme perusteella suosittelemme moniammatillisen tiimin (lääkäri, 
liikenneopettaja psykologi, toimintaterapeutti) käyttöä vaativissa ajokyvyn arvioinneissa. 
Arviointityössä ensisijaista on johdonmukainan ja perusteltu käsitteellinen malli 
konkreettisten arviointimenetelmien voidessa vaihdella. Tien päällä suoritettu ajokoe on 
kuitenkin tehtävä aina, kun se turvallisuussyistä on mahdollista. 
 
Avainsanat: Ajaminen, ajokyky, toiminnan subjekti, toiminnan teoria 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
For disabled persons the possibility to drive a car is especially significant because it 
markedly increases their possibilities to cope with life, affording freedom of mobility 
independent of the help of others or public transportation. On the other hand, in Finland 
300-400 persons die in traffic accidents and approximately 10 000 are injured yearly. 
Traffic has its risks and accidents have enormous immaterial and material expenses (see 
Medical aspects of fitness to drive 1995; Liikennelääketiede 1991, 2002).   
Society tries to minimise traffic risk by making driving instruction obligatory, by 
implementing technical standards and controls, by improving the traffic environment, 
by enforcing traffic rules and regulations and also by controlling that drivers have 
sufficient abilities and skills for safe driving. The requirements regarding driving ability 
are stipulated in the Road Traffic Act, in the driving licence decree, and in the EU 
Driving License Directive (Tieliikennelaki 2006). In the act it is said that a driver is not 
permitted to drive if he/she has a disease, deficiency, disability, fatigue or other 
corresponding reason which significantly impair his/her ability to act as a driver (64 § 
(3.8.1990/676); decree 9 § (5.1.1996/2); (9.12.1999/1168)). So, the subject of the 
evaluations in the frame of a driving licence are deficiencies and potential risk factors of 
the driver and the aim is to find out significant driving related defects, disabilities, and 
restrictions of his or her driving ability.  
A potential alternative way could be to construct an image of safe driving from the 
model of a skilled  performance (Keskinen 2002). However, since the work is addressed 
to clinicians who often make pass/fail decisions in a ‘legal’ restriction-centred context 
we work a little bit more with deficiencies than with resources and potentials.    
Traffic research, and also an evaluation of drivers, have their origin and a social 
order in the beginning of the 20th century when urbanisation was progressing  intensely 
and when the number of cars was quickly increasing. This resulted in an increase of 
traffic accidents. In Finland the first car accident occurred in 1907 and, of course, in this 
very first accident the driver was intoxicated (Salovaara 1976).  
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1.1. Psychological factors and accident risk   
 
1.1.1.  Accident proneness 
 
Historically, the first models of driving were developed on the basis of individual 
differences. Munsterberg, a central figure of the so called psychotechnique, studied tram 
drivers from a safety standpoint and professional suitability during the first decade of 
the 20th century. He underlined the significance of personality factors in such 
dangerous professions as tram driving. Later, Tramm (according to Kotik 1987)  added 
attentiveness, ability to make prompt decisions, quick reactions and tolerance for fatigue 
to the list of needed qualifications. Marbe (1921) came forward with the famous 
proposal of accidents as a result of inborn factors and of critical experiences. The 
psychodynamic school of thought explained accident proneness with inner conflicts and 
unconscious motives. An accident proneness was seen as aggressiveness turned toward 
one's self. Psychoanalytically-orientated researchers thought that by an accident  
persons punish themselves (Menninger 1955). The accident proneness studies attempted 
to predict accidents according to relatively stable traits and basic capabilities.  
The concept of accident proneness was replaced by the concept of the accident risk 
which is connected to a large number of different factors. Häkkinen (1958, 1979) 
showed in his follow-up study that accident proneness was a very permanent quality and 
that individual differences explained over half of the variation in accidents. There was 
no relationship between simple reaction time and accident rate. However, the subjects 
were professional drivers, i.e., the selected groups, who due to the forced-pace nature of 
their task cannot pace their times to the degree that private drivers can (Näätänen and  
Summala 1976). It would therefore not be correct to directly apply these results to non-
professional drivers, who have greater freedom in planning and carrying out their 
driving.  
 
1.1.2.  Locus of control  
 
The theory of locus of control have stimulated the interests of traffic researchers since 
the 60s. Rotter (1966) defined locus of control as a personality attribute reflecting the  
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degree to which a person generally perceives events to be under their own control 
(internal locus of  control) or under the control of powerful others or other outside 
forces (external locus of control). It is quite understandable that an external locus of 
control is related to less responsible driving and accidents. However, the empirical 
findings have been mixed (Lajunen 1997).  
According to Hoyt (1973) the locus is permanent and the external locus is firmly 
connected to accident risk.  If this is the case, as Hoyt (1973) claims, then we are 
dealing with an accident prone personality. Guastello and Guastello (1986) found no 
direct relation between locus of control and accident involvement while Arthur, Barrett 
and Alexander (1991) found a positive relationship between locus of control and 
accidents. Montag  and Comrey (1987) developed driving targeted scales for measuring 
‘driving internality’ (DI) and ‘driving externality’ (DE). They found that DI and DE had 
a stronger relationship with safe driving that Rotter’s I-E scale among new applicants 
for driving licenses and drivers who had been involved in a fatal motor accident. 
Driving externality was positively associated with fatal accidents whereas driving 
internality was associated with caution. Later Arthur and Doverspike (1992) reported an 
opposite pattern of correlation and Iversen and Rundmo (2002), as well as Guastello and 
Guastello (1986), did not find any correlation between locus of control and risky 
driving. Lajunen and Summala (1995) found that drivers scoring high in DI saw 
themselves as alert and careful drivers who try to predict possible risks in traffic.  
Özkan and Lajunen (2005) claimed that two factor structure is too simple for 
identifying different attributions of causes behind traffic accidents and they developed a 
driving target multidimensional locus of control scale (T-LOC) with the scales of  ‘self’, 
‘vehicle and environment’, ‘other drivers’ and ‘fate scale’. Their results showed that 
internals are more likely to be involved in accidents and to engage in risky driving than 
externals. The question of locus of control and driving safety still remains open and 
further studies are needed. However, there is support  for the opinion that restricted 
drivers with an accentuated external locus of control are the more prominent risk group 
than drivers with an obvious internal locus of control.  
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1.1.3. Temperament and personality factors  
 
Descriptive taxonomies of individual differences have been a tradition in personality 
theories since Plato and Galen. Presently, there is a near consensus among descriptive 
taxonomists concerning the following five fundamental dimensions of personality 
sometimes referred to as 'the Big 5' or 'B5' extraversion/introversion, emotional 
stability/instability (neuroticism), agreeableness, conscientiousness, and openness (see 
John 1990). There is strong agreement that the dimensions of extraversion/introversion 
and neuroticism/emotional stability are fundamental parts of any personality taxonomy. 
Associations of these dimensions with accidents are widely studied in the field of  
traffic psychology with the contradictory results: Fine found a significant simple 
relationship between extraversion and both numbers of crashes and violations in a study 
of 937 male students. Shaw and Sichel (1971) found bad drivers to be more extraverted 
but Wilson and Greensmith found no difference in the extraversion or neuroticism 
scores of crash-involved and crash-free drivers. Sigh reported an association between 
introversion and crash involvement (see Ranney 1994; Elander, West and French 1993). 
Loo (1979) found that when extraversion scores were broken down into sub-scales of 
impulsiveness and sociability, impulsiveness alone carried a relationship to risky 
driving. Similarly, it can be supposed that some aspects of neuroticism, like moodiness 
and nervousness, may increase a driver’s accident risk by increasing the number of 
driving errors whereas other aspects of neuroticism (like being a worrier) might actually 
strengthen a person’s concern for safety (Lajunen 2001). Thus, personality dimensions 
are not one-dimensional qualities regarding driving safety. Driver evaluation cannot be 
based on such contradictory dimensions.  
In his review of studies about personality factors and driving behaviour, Beirness 
(1993) concluded that hostile and aggressive tendencies can influence driving behaviour 
in a manner that increases the likelihood of crash involvement which is also the result of 
the study of Lajunen and Parker (2001). Deffenbacher, Oetting and Lynch (1994) 
conceptualised driving anger as a personality trait related to trait anger but more context 
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or situation bound. It has also been found that safety orientation, i.e., emphasis on safety 
skills, was related to a relative lack of aggression, whereas drivers' emphasis on 
perceptual-motor skills ("skill orientation'') was positively related to driver aggression 
(Lajunen and Summala 1995). It is very difficult for a person to reliably evaluate their 
own aggressiveness because of psychological defences. Speaking about driving anger as 
an activity specified personality quality sounds pseudoscientific. From the point of 
traffic safety anger is particularly a problem because hardly anyone can reliably 
estimate his or her own level of aggressiveness.  
In general one can state that the individual-differences approach is primarily 
negative and restriction centred. Human qualities and abilities are not seen as resources 
but rather as their limitations.  This only seems to excite researchers’ interest.  
 
 
1.1.4.  Attention and situational awareness 
 
Numerous studies have found significant correlation between measures of selective 
attention and accident involvement (e.g., Kahneman et al.1973; Owsley et al 1991). 
Such higher-order  perceptual  functions  like visual  search,  visual  speed,  selective, 
sustained and divided  attention,  and visuo-spatial impairments have to be put forward 
as determinants of practical fitness to drive (e.g. Tant 2002). In on-road tests the largest 
differences between brain-injured and healthy groups also tend to occur in divided-
attention situations.  
According to Ranney (1994) the most consistent predictor for accident causation is 
selective attention. Also by Barbas and Wilde (2001) the most empirically well-
established cognitive factors related to driving ability include visual attention 
(sustained, selective, and divided attention) and visuospatial abilities. The practical 
consequence is that divided attention conditions should be part of the 
neuropsychological and practical assessment with regard to fitness to drive (Brouwer et 
al 2002).  
Field dependence was found to be linked to accidents (Mihal and Barrett 1976) but 
more recent work has failed to find a strong relationship between perceptual style and 
accident measures (e.g. McKenna et al 1985).  
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Situational awareness can be defined as the perception of the elements in the 
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning 
and a projection of their status in the near future (Endsley 1995).  
Stanton et al (2001) write that the importance of situational awareness in 
maintaining safe control of an aircraft cannot be overstated. The information processing 
approach has been best represented by Endsley’s (1995) theoretical three-level model of 
situational awareness. Endsley proposes that situational awareness is normally discussed 
in terms of system-specific subcategories, such as mode awareness, spatial awareness 
and time awareness.  
The model of the perceptual cycle presents situational awareness as a dynamic 
interaction between humans and their environment. Proponents of this approach suggest 
that it is the context of the interaction that defines the situational awareness (Smith and 
Hancock 1995).  
In the frame of activity theory, situational awareness is seen as only one of many 
components of reflective-orientational activity. The key processes that produce 
situational awareness are the combination of the conceptual model, the image–goal and 
the subjectively relevant task conditions. If what the human operator regards as 
subjectively relevant is misguided, then a faulty orientation to the situation can result. 
This may be regarded as loss of an appropriate situational awareness. Once set on this 
path, through which all future orientation and exploratory activity is guided, it may be 
difficult to re-orient the human operator to evaluate what is objectively important and 
develop a more realistic reflection of the situation (Bedny and Meister 1999). As with 
the psychological activity theoretical approach in the model, the nature of the task and 
the goals of the subject of an activity are underlined. So, the extent to which processes 
are involved is dependent on the nature of the task and on the goals of the subject. There 
is no doubt that situational awareness is a significant safe factor in car driving. 
 
1.1.5.  Executive functions in driving 
 
The term executive functions refers to a variety of loosely related higher-order cognitive 
processes and skills like initiation, planning, hypothesis generation, concept formation, 
cognitive flexibility, decision making, problem solving, regulation including self-
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regulation, judgement, feedback utilisation, and self-perception that are necessary for 
effective and contextually-appropriate behaviour (see e.g. Daigneault et al. 2002). 
Executive functions are high-level cognitive functions that are involved in the control 
and direction of lower-level functions (Stuss and Levine 2002). 
Driving also involves higher mental abilities that supervise all movements and 
decisions taken by the driver; i.e., executive functions. So, executive functions play a 
crucial role in driving because this task requires a complex integration of information 
and supervision of multiple actions that must be adapted to environmental cues 
(Daigneault et al. 2002).  
Despite the growing interest and literature on executive functions, a consensus on 
its meaning remains elusive (Perry and Hodges 1999).  
 
1.2.  Gender, age and driving experience 
 
1.2.1. Gender 
 
Every measure of involvement in fatal crashes recorded in the United States during the 
1980s showed rates for men that were approximately double those for women (Evans 
1991) and as for Finland,  Laapotti (2003) concluded that female drivers are more safety 
orientated than male drivers. On the other hand, female drivers have more problems 
with vehicle handling and mastering traffic situations, while males have more problems 
with personal self-control in traffic.  
In Finnish material, men’s risks were more often linked to intentional risk taking 
when compared to women whereas women’s were rather linked to knowledge and, 
skills and know-how. Females were at a lower risk of crashing than males at all ages but 
the difference was greatest for young and inexperienced drivers; the crash liability of 
females was 30% less than that of males (Salo, 2003).  
 
1.2.2.  Age 
 
Young drivers drive faster, use shorter following distances and are more likely to violate 
traffic lights than older drivers (Summala 1987). Greater accident risk and more deviant 
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driving styles are associated with being male and young (see Elander et al.1993; Parker 
et al.1995; Summala 1987). On the other hand, in Finland it has been estimated that a 
proportional number of traffic accidents in male drivers over 70 years old is nine time 
higher compared to 30-39-year-old drivers, and 13 time higher in female drivers. On the 
other hand young male drivers at the peak of their physical and psychomotor abilities, 
are the most unsafe drivers together with the elderly drivers (VALT, 1997). So, age as 
such does not yet tell anything about a driver’s potential safety or lack of safety.  
Although elderly healthy drivers may be equally as safe as younger drivers the 
problem is that completely healthy persons among the elderly drivers are a minority. 
Ageing influences driving ability through psychomotor and health restrictions, but older 
drivers can compensate for their reduced reaction time and steering control, for 
example, by reducing their speed and following at a greater distance or restricting their 
driving to short and familiar routes during daylight hours (see Hakamies-Blomqvist 
1998; Barbas and Wilde 2001). Elderly persons also do not drive so much and therefore 
their personal accident risk is not very high (Laaksonen 2002).  
Elderly drivers also have some advantages over their younger counterparts. These 
include driving experience, maturity, reduced driving exposure per year and often, the 
flexibility to make their trips at times and to places that they perceive as being safe. 
These advantages, however, are not necessarily true for all elderly drivers in all 
situations, especially in complex dynamic traffic situations like left turns at intersections 
(Daigneault et al. 2002). 
Hakamies-Blomqvist remind (1998) that  'ageing' is a multidimensional concept but 
among traffic researchers, the word 'age' is practically always understood in its purely 
chronological sense, i.e., as time elapsed since birth, ignoring alternative or 
complementary biological, psychological, or social definitions. Ageing patterns differ 
greatly among individuals: Some drivers will attain any theoretical threshold values in 
early middle age while a few may continue as middle-aged- like drivers up to their 
second century. The distribution of accident risk may indeed be bimodal rather than 
normal; in virtue of their cautious driving style and self-critical attitude, many older 
persons are extremely safe drivers, while certain pathological subgroups will have 
functional decrements leading to considerable risk increase (ibid).  
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One can agree with Hakamies-Blomqvist (1998) that  “while earlier research mostly 
was guided by the question "Why do older drivers have higher accident risk?" the 
alternative question "Which older drivers have higher accident risk?" has gained 
momentum in the 1990s”. A general finding in the literature is that faster and more 
deviant driving styles are associated with being male and young.  
By summarising age factor in driving safety one can conclude that drivers under 25 
years of age have the highest rates of crash involvement on a population and licence 
basis, but when the distance travelled is  taken into account, rates of crash involvement 
for the 75 or more age group are as high as those of the youngest age group. Females 
have higher rates of crash involvement than males in all age groups (Ryan, Legge and 
Rosman 1998). Although older drivers’ accident involvement may be overly pessimistic 
(Hakamies-Blomqvist, Wiklund  and Henriksson 2005) it is a fact that drivers are 
ageing and that among elderly drivers there are more driving related cognitive and 
health problems when compared to younger drivers. Aged drivers have an increased risk 
of traffic crashes in situations were the cognitive load on the driver is increased, e.g., at 
intersections (Harms 1991; Hakamies-Blomqvist 1993;  Preusser et al 1998; Viitanen et 
al. 1998).  
 
1.2.3.  Experience 
 
Generally it is difficult to separate age and experience. Both age and experience play a 
major role, but further analysis has indicated that the role of experience may have been 
overestimated  (Elander et al 1993; Salo, 2003). Further, although accident risk 
drastically decreases during the first years of a licence but experience does not 
automatically mean expertise and increasing safety (Duncan, Williams and Brown 
1991) as statistics indisputably show (www.tilastokeskus.fi).  
The odds of a crash being at-fault decreased overall about 6% per year for 7 years 
after their original license date among in young adult drivers, but the decline was more 
than twice as fast for women as for men (Waller et al 2001). Early stages of driving are 
connected with the highest crash rates, but it is difficult to attribute this all to lack of 
skill (Summala 1987; Evans, 1991). Jonah’s (1986) conclusion that “even when one 
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controls for the quantity and quality of exposure to risk, young drivers are still at 
greatest risk of causality accident involvement”.  
Rajalin and Summala (1997) studied the effects of involvement in a fatal accident 
on the surviving drivers’ subsequent driving behaviour. Their data showed that the fatal 
accident affects driving behaviour, but only for a relatively short time. Most commonly, 
the drivers reported that the effect was limited to those circumstances and situations 
which led to the accident and did not generalise to safer driving practices. Even 
unfortunate events do not permanently change  people into more safety- orientated 
drivers. 
According to Lajunen and Summala (1995) driving experience is associated with 
confidence in one's own driving skills, but negatively related to concern for safety.  
 
1.3.  Diseases and driving 
 
According to the courts of inquiry the role of diseases in the fatal accidents that occurred 
in Finland during 1990-2001 were marginal, only 6 %. The role of  fatigue (8 %), state of 
mind (5 %) and  functional ability (5 %) were also minor compared to speeding (17 %), 
intoxication (15 %),  lack of knowledge and know-how (13 %) and errors in decision 
making and perception (10 %) when the same person may have several risk factors (Salo 
2003). By the other sources the role of diseases are even more unimportant explaining 
only 0.1-1.0 % of the number of the fatal accidents (Medical aspects of fitness to drive 
1995; Liikennelääketiede 1991, 2002). Further, it is probably often unclear when an 
accident is the consequence of disease and when an accident has simply occurred to a 
sick person (Laaksonen 2002).  
Sjögren  et al (1996) studied autopsied car drivers in northern Sweden over a 13-
year period (n = 480, aged  18 years), who were fatally injured and died within 3 days 
of the crash. Almost one quarter of the drivers were found to have intrinsic medical 
factors. Drivers with intrinsic medical factors were often at fault, and in 6% of the 
drivers, intrinsic medical factors were probably the underlying cause of the crash; in 
1.3% the probability was strong. In the 60-year-old and more group the, intrinsic 
medical factors were the underlying cause of the crash in 19% of the cases; the 
probability was strong in 4%. 
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There are exhaustive reviews about diseases and driving (e.g. Medical aspects of fitness 
to drive 1995; Liikennelääketiede 1991, 2002) but here cases involving evaluations of 
driving ability are in someway particularly difficult. Results of Dionne et al. (1995) 
show that diabetic truck drivers have more accidents than drivers in good health. An 
influence of diabetes on safe driving is difficult to evaluate by the standard short-term 
cross-sectional methods but a more longitudinal follow-up is needed because patients’ 
states of variation. The number of persons suffering from diabetes is quickly increasing.  
Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is characterised by impairments in 
attention and/or impulse control, contributing to significant difficulties in social, 
academic and occupational functioning. Thus, it is logical to suppose that ADHD is 
linked to accident risk. And the results of  Reimer  et al. (2005) indicate that ADHD 
status is positively and significantly related to error, lapse and violation scores of 
driving. Reported driving violations and errors among ADHD subjects were mediated 
by age, suggesting that adults with ADHD may learn or evolve strategies to reduce their 
driving risks. It is highly probable that the percentage of persons suffering from ADHD 
syndrome will increase in driver evaluations in near future because persons with ADHD 
are often not capable of the sustained effort required in driving. 
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is the most common cause of impaired cognitive function 
in the elderly. Its prevalence increases from 0.9% in the age group of 65–74 years to 
26.8% among persons aged 75 years and older and affects over one third of the persons 
older than 85 years (Viitanen et al. 1998). AD has consequences for driving. It is likely 
that many of the killed aged drivers have incipient or unrecognised AD (Perry and 
Hodges 1999). Even though many patients with mild AD may make the road test or 
make it in ‘‘simple’’ traffic, more complicated or unexpected situations or long-lasting, 
‘‘boring’’ performances often create problems in traffic (Adler, Rottunda and Dysken 
1996; Viitanen et al. 1998). In AD attention is the first non-memory domain to be 
affected, before deficits in language and visuospatial functions (Perry and Hodges 1999; 
Solfrizzi 2002). AD patients’ cognitive performance- memory, visuospatial functions 
and verbal capacity -  is insidiously  declining. Therefore, patients are usually oblivious 
to their disease, nor do they realise their impaired driving performance (Hunt et al 
1993), nor do they seek medical examination during the early stage of the disease. 
Furthermore, physicians are not necessarily able to recognise cognitive impairment in 
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routine clinical examination (Johansson et al 1996). And with ageing the number of  
persons suffering from AD is increasing  as well. 
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) often results in perceptual, cognitive, and motor 
dysfunction and restrictions leading to limitations in driving. However, according to 
Brouwer et al (2002) only in a minority of TBI patients has the question of fitness to 
drive been officially considered. A total of 60% of the TBI survey participants reported 
that they were currently active drivers and over half of traumatic brain injury survivors 
had not been professionally evaluated for driving competency (Fisk et al 1997). Among 
them certainly are a lot of unsafe drivers.  
Hernetkoski and Keskinen (1998) showed that the number of suicides and negligent 
drivers had increased significantly during the studied, nearly 20-year period. Also, the 
relative proportion of suicides had increased from 1.1% to 7.4% and the relative 
proportion of negligent drivers from 11.2% to 20.0%. Severe depression causes traffic 
risk due to self-destructive behaviour, but what else can one do besides advise avoiding 
unnecessary driving during times when suicidal thoughts may come into a driver’s 
mind? Depression may also have cognitive consequences which are, for the moment, 
poorly studied. According to Wickens (1992), anxiety and stress can narrow attention 
span and limit attentional-reserve capacity.  
Several health problems are likely to result in impaired driving performance, and 
consequently elevated crash risk. In addition, some medicines taken for different 
illnesses may affect driving performance apart from the effects of the health problem 
per se (Sagberg 2006). In 19% of fatal crashes among older drivers, medical factors 
which probably contributed to the crash have been found (Sjogren, Eriksson and 
Ostrom1996).  
Both young healthy drivers and elderly drivers with cognitive and motor 
deficiencies are noteworthy accident risk groups. This clearly shows that such a 
complicated form of human performance as driving a car is only partly a biomedical 
function. Only a minor proportion of accidents are caused by diseases and therefore 
there is no grounds for disease-centeredness in driver evaluations. Considering the 
minor role of diseases in fatal accidents the connections between accidents and diseases 
have been studied very intensively. However, there are still lack of the controlled and 
the methodologically correct studies of the significance of the diseases to traffic safety 
 23  
(Laaksonen 2002).  The disease-centred studies concerning driving ability abound but, 
as the selected groups, they do not represent all the drivers and  the findings of these 
studies cannot be generalised. One ought to avoid an excessive medicalisation of an 
evaluation of driving ability.  
 
1.4.  Visual functions and driving  
 
Visual  acuity,  contrast  sensitivity  and  visual  fields are  usually  assessed  by  a 
medical expert. Static visual acuity continues to be used as the principal visual 
requirement for licensing drivers in most countries (Lamble et al 2002). Visual acuity of  
0.5 (the European Union norm) is not a sufficient prerequisite for safe driving. Visual 
acuity is of primary importance only in some limited driving tasks which do not make a 
crucial difference to the overall picture of somebody’s total driving ability. 
According to van Zomeren et al (1988), when very  specific sub-tasks of  the 
general driving task  are considered, the correlation with assessments on the impairment 
level are increased, and in this respect Tant (2002) wrote that it is intuitive that, for 
example, reading signs or reading licence plates  could well be highly related to visual 
acuity. But  then  only one  aspect  of  the driving  task  is  considered,  and  thus  
practical  fitness  to  drive  is  only  partly  addressed.  
Abnormalities in binocularity and depth perception, contrast sensitivity, dark 
adaptation, glare sensitivity or colour vision could possibly increase the risk of a traffic 
accident (Mäntyjärvi, Juntunen and Tuppurainen 1998). Visual acuity is only very 
mildly associated with driving safety, and Owsley and  McGwin concluded that visual 
perception during driving is  not  exclusively dependent    on  visual sensory function, 
but also on higher-order functions, which they refer to as “central processing skills” 
(Owsley and  McGwin 1999).  
An evaluation paying attention to only one, e.g., lower-order visual function, or a 
few factors, result necessarily results in an inadequate explanation of the variability in 
or in low correlation with practical fitness  to  drive  (van Zomeren, Brouwer, 
Rothengatter and Snoek 1988; Tant 2002). On the basis of an analysis of driving 
performance it is easy to understand that such higher-level visuospatial functions as 
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attention (sustained and selective), vigilance and visual scanning are more relevant to 
safe driving than lower-level functions like visual acuity.  
 
 
1.5.  Compensation possibilities 
 
Driving allows for a great deal of human and technical compensation for limitations 
(Coleman et al. 2002). In real situations drivers are able to make higher-level decisions 
that affect driving safety (Summala 1996) and by these decisions drivers can reduce 
influence of  their limited functions and qualities. The findings of Owsley et al (2003) 
imply that visually-impaired older drivers at a higher risk for crash involvement may 
benefit from educational interventions by reducing their driving exposure and increasing 
their avoidance of visually challenging driving situations. Brower et al (2002) claim that 
slowness of information processing need not be a problem for practical fitness to drive 
and driving safety, as long as adequate tactical and strategical level compensations are 
part of a patients’ repertoire.  
Now a number of technological countermeasures have been proposed to reduce the 
incidence of accidents due to driver impairment, due to the influence of fatigue, alcohol, 
drugs, distraction, emotional stress, and so forth (e.g. Brookhuis et al.1997; Fukuda, 
Adachi, Nishida and Akutsu 1995; Qiang and Xiaojie 2002). We can anticipate that the 
presentation of impairment feedback will lead to behavioural adaptation, leading to 
changes in driver behaviour at the strategic (e.g., drivers may discontinue their 
“journey”), manoeuvring (e.g., drivers may reduce speed), or control levels (i.e., 
accuracy of vehicular input may improve) (Fairclough 2000).  
So, much can be compensated for by mental and technical means. However, these 
adaptations are of  little use to the possible accompanying higher-level cognitive, 
perceptual  and  spatial  impairments (Tant 2002) nor can they be compensated for by 
apparently more careful behaviour on the road (Daigneault et al. 2002). 
 
1.6.  Driving skills and style  
 
At present, driving is generally seen as being composed of driving skills and driving 
style (e.g. Näätänen and Summala 1976; Elander et al.1993), where driving skill is seen 
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to be associated with  driving performance and driving style with driving behaviour 
(Evans 1991).  
 
1.6.1.  Driving skills 
 
The skill model of driving was supported by early accident theories with the idea that 
some of us are less skilful drivers and, therefore, more prone to accident (Summala 
1985). Real-world motor skill comprises both knowing and doing, and the degree of 
automation may be seen as an indicator of the skill. Driving skill improves with practise 
and training, but through experience bad habits also develop (Duncan et al. 1991; 
Backman 2001). 
Brookuis et al. (2003) connect driver impairment with driving skills so that  driving 
impairment is manifested in such driving errors as following too closely, overtaking in 
the face of oncoming traffic, overtaking at a junction, following an overtaking vehicle 
too closely, changing lanes abruptly, straddling lanes and driving too fast for the 
circumstances.   
According to Laapotti (2003) and Salo (2003) Finnish female drivers have more 
problems with driving skills while Finnish males’ problems are associated with an 
overestimation of their skills, with intentional risky behaviour.  
 
1.6.1.  Driving style  
 
First Rippon (according to Kotik 1987) noted that some pilots often made dangerous 
errors and he reported that they ‘fly as they live’ and later Tillman and Hobbes (1949) 
applied it to the car drivers in the well-known form: ‘they drive as live’. The view is 
holistic underlining consistency of human behaviour in different domains. Later Evans 
(1991, 2002), Summala (1996) and Keskinen  (1982, 1992) among others have 
considered driving in a wider frame than as a mere driving event.  
Driving style becomes established over a period of years. Driving style is assumed 
to reflect choices that drivers make. These choices may reflect attitudes and beliefs of 
drivers. Unsafe driving styles may arise from two main sources: attitudes toward driving 
and level of skill and safety. According to Kuikka and Mäkinen (2003) driving skills 
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include judgement, control of operation, perception, decision making and motor 
movements, whereas driving style includes uniqueness of the character and motives, 
attitudes, emotional reactions and control. In multiple regression from style factors, only 
high driving speed remained a significant predictor of crash rate (West et al.1993; Salo 
2003). Choice of speed has been shown to be consistent over time (Wasielewski 1984). 
Elander et al. (1993) came to the conclusions that, first, both driving skill and 
driving style are related to differential crash involvement; second, speed of detecting 
hazards in the traffic environment and more general abilities to detect visual targets in a 
complex milieu and to switch attention rapidly, have been consistently related to crash 
frequency, independently of age, sex, and annual mileage; third, faster driving and 
deviant driving behaviour are associated with more frequent crashes. 
The results of Ferguson et al. (2001) indicate that childrens’ driving records in the 
first few years of licensure are related to the driving records of their parents, especially 
to violations. Children whose parents had three or more violations were 38% more 
likely to have had a violation compared with children whose parents had none. Thus, it 
can be supposed that driving style is connected to lifestyle and one’s lifestyle depends 
on the lifestyle of their significant others. 
Although driving skill improves with practise, the pass rate on the standard driving 
test falls steadily with increasing age (Maycock et al. 1991). Does this indicate possible  
defects in the on-road evaluations of elderly drivers?  
 
 
1.7.  Models of driving behaviour 
 
1.7.1.  Hierarchical models of driving behaviours  
 
Such a human activity as driving a car is a dynamic system which constantly changes 
and transforms itself in the process of carrying out goal-oriented actions. Therefore 
behaviours and an activity have to be constantly regulated by the subject.  
The simplest way to analyse driving is to divide it into subtasks, and several such  
lists of driving tasks have been made (e.g. McKnight and Adams 1970; Lourens 1988). 
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They are merely descriptive and were soon replaced by the hierarchical models which 
are more explanatory.    
Michon’s (1985) three-level cognitive control hierachy is widely used in traffic 
literature. It describes driving as a hierarchy of subtasks of the strategic, tactical, and 
operational level (Michon 1985). Generally an operational level involves execution of 
basic driving operations such as steering control and brake application, demands coping 
with risks and is time dependent. By the lower-level perceptual and sensorimotor 
operations the car is held on course, and this level consists of  such largely automatic 
action patterns as, e.g., steering, braking, and shifting. The tactical level is described as 
a risk-taking level, which is, on the average, time dependent or there is at least a slight 
time pressure. It involves in-traffic decisions like speed adaptation and use of headlights 
during poor visibility. Finally, on the strategic level, choice and decisions are made 
concerning mode of transportation, route, time of day, and so on. These decisions are 
usually made without time pressure and often before engaging in actual driving (Michon 
1985; Molen and Bötticher 1987; Ranney 1994; Brouwer et al. 2002). 
In the Rasmussen’s  (1987) hierarchical control model, driving behaviour is 
differentiated into skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based behaviour, and 
hierarchical structure is related to control errors. Later, Lehto (1991) proposed a fourth 
level, referred to as judgement-based behaviour. Other regulation models also exist (see 
e.g. Frese 1998), but let us now look a little bit closer at Rasmussen’s regulation system. 
The main distinction between the skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based levels is 
in the degree of automation of behaviour. Drivers’ behaviours are supposed to be more 
homogeneous and predictable at the skill-based and rule-based levels than at the 
knowledge-based level.  
The lowest level of regulation of behaviours Rasmussen called skill level (ibid). It is 
the level of regulation of automatised skills. Information processing at this level of 
regulation is rapid, effortless and parallel, but the cause of automated, unconsciousness 
character of regulation the process of regulation is also very rigid and it is difficult to 
modify ineffective or harmful automatisms of activity and behaviour. The second level 
of regulation in Rasmussen’s (ibid) taxonomy is called rule-based. At this level there are 
ready-made actions or programmes of actions and operations in memory which, 
however, must be adjusted to prevailing situations and circumstances. In driving this 
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level is, of course, important, because besides technical skills and psychomotor abilities 
driving requires obeying the established laws and rules for the safety of one's self and 
others. The third level is knowledge-based in Rasmussen’s (ibid) model of regulation. 
Compared to the previous levels at this conscious level of regulation the regulation 
process is slower and constrained by limited resources of information processing 
capacity. Thus, when conscious regulation of activity is needed, the work is often 
discontinuous, inefficient and slow. Just think about driving a car for the first time.   
Michon’s and Rassmusen’s models were later combined (Ranney 1994) to classify 
selected driving tasks: operational decisions take place on the skill-based level, tactical 
decisions on the rule-based level, and the strategic decisions on the knowledge-based 
level.  
Parker et al. (1995) associate accidents with conscious rule-based offences and,  
according to activity theory, conscious actions belong in the hierarchy of a subject to the 
personality level. So, the findings of Parker et al. (ibid) confirm the activity theoretical 
view of the significance of  the personality in human activities (Rubinshtein 2003) and 
this is also the case in evaluations of such socio-practical human activity as driving a 
car.  Typology, however, is only a description and it does not yet explain how and why 
accidents occur.  
All the levels of control mentioned above can be found in driving. Thus, recognition 
of these levels of control has relevance to the evaluation of driving ability. However, in 
our context, in a driver’s evaluation, the theory in question completely lacks the most 
important level of regulation and control, namely the metacognitive level, the level of 
self-reflection of regulation. Normally people are aware of the strategies and tactics they 
use, they also know how they plan their activities, how they set their goals, how they 
receive and process feedback (Frese 1998), and at least to some extent they are also 
aware of how they make decisions. The metacognitive level is not used when rules and 
goals, as well as the methods of attaining the goals, of activity is known by the subject 
of activity. However, the metacognitive level of regulation is of greatest importance 
when a driver makes strategical decisions concerning his/her driving condition, 
planning driving routes and time. Emotions also play a significant role in regulation of 
such activity as driving a car. They reveal our relationship to the surrounding world, to 
other people and society  (Bedny and Karwowski 2006). In Rasmussen’s model there is 
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no clearly addressed place for emotions. The taxonomy of Rasmussen is not a properly 
hierarchical system because there are no functional links between the levels (Keskinen 
2002); a higher level does not regulate a lower one.   
Mikkonen and Keskinen (1980) go about characterising the problem of control and 
regulation of driving on the basis of ‘theory of inner models of driving behaviour’. 
Their theory consists of three levels of inner models: vehicle manoeuvring, mastering 
traffic situations and goals and context of driving. With experience and education the 
information a driver has about traffic situations forms to the inner models.  
Then driving is regulated by these inner models. Inner models represent routes, sights, 
and handling of a vehicle. External factors affect driving through inner models. 
Consequently, the degree of development of inner models is associated with accident 
risk.  
Later Keskinen (1996) expanded the theory of inner models by adding a fourth 
level: goals for life and skills for living. By this enlargement the role of motives is more 
heavily emphasised (Laapotti 2003). The levels interact with each other so that the 
higher levels direct the lower ones (Hatakka et al. 2002; Keskinen 1996). Driving 
experience only influences the lower levels of driving. The four level model of driver 
behaviour  includes the following levels in order from highest to lowest: a) goals for life 
and skills for living, b) goals and context of driving, c) mastering traffic situations ,and 
d) vehicle manoeuvring.  The first level offers a broader perspective for driver  
capacities and compensation resources. With life experience a driver may increase his 
or her knowledge about his or her own abilities and limitations; life itself often changes 
values towards more safety-directed driving, and of course, driving skills usually 
improve with experience. Strategy of driving reflects the content of the highest level of 
hierarchy which also includes elements beyond proper driving (e.g. Keskinen, 1996, 
Summala, 1996), whereas tactics of driving are linked to the goals of driving. In the 
strategic level a driver chooses the transport used, makes a decision on a trip and times a 
drive. Tactics of driving covers, e.g., mapping out a route of the trip.  
Enlargement of the theory of the inner models done by Keskinen (1996) enables or 
even compels the inclusion of higher-level factors such as motives, attitudes, and values 
to driver evaluations. Interestingly, the idea of Mikkonen and Keskinen (1980) of the 
inner models as a mediator through which external stimuli and factors influence driver 
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behaviour, comes very close to the principle of  determinism from Rubinshtein: 
‘External causes act through internal conditions’ (Rubinshtein 2003).  
Hacker (1981) specifies four levels of regulation: sensory-motor, perceptual, 
motivational and intellectual. There are significant differences between the levels of 
regulation. First, objective ‘degrees of freedom’ define the level of regulation that is 
possible. In traffic the most degrees of freedom are in the situation when a driver plans a 
route and time of trip. On a road degrees of freedom are limited because of traffic rules 
and regulations. Second, tasks and their structure vary in different levels of regulation. 
On lower levels – the sensory-motor and perceptual level – tasks are most often not 
even conscious. Third, psychological processes and operative images (a cocept of 
Pushkin, 1965) involved in regulation differ from each other on different levels of 
regulation. Fourth, how detailed the programme of actions is, varies with levels of 
regulation. Automated programmes are rigid while intellectual ones are more flexible. 
According to Hacker (ibid) planning and realisation of activity are hierarchically 
organised so that a higher level includes lower levels which work subordinately 
regarding higher levels of regulation. Due to a complex nature of driving an accident 
may in principle results from a failure of any level of regulation. In an accident resulting 
from a ‘human factor’ the question is always focused on the failure of a driver  to 
control and regulate an activity. 
 
1.7.2.  Functional models  
 
Functional models as alternatives to the skill-based models include both motivational  
and information-processing models (Atkinson 1957; Naatanen and Summala 1974, 
1976; Summala  1988; Wilde 1982; Fuller 1984).  
1.7.2.1.  Motivational models 
 
Motivational models focus on “what the driver actually does” in a given traffic situation 
rather than on the maximum skills of a driver. One of the most important findings made 
in motivational studies was that on-road driving differs considerably from a driver’s 
capabilities. A related distinction has been made between performance and behaviour 
(Naatanen and  Summala 1976; Shinar 1978;  Evans 1991;  Elander, West  and  French 
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1993), where performance refers to what drivers are capable of doing, while behaviour 
refers to what drivers actually do on the road. Performance in laboratory tests does not 
necessarily predict actual driving performance. Therefore a distinction should be made 
between a person's maximum level of driving skill and how well drivers apply their 
skills. The main assumptions of these models are that driving is self-paced and that 
drivers select the amount of risk they are willing to tolerate in any given situation. Risk-
related driving behaviour is a central issue, and the driver is seen as an active decision 
maker, rather than a passive responder. These models emphasise transient or situation-
specific factors. The risk associated with possible outcomes is seen as the main factor 
influencing behaviour.  
Summala (1985) argues that the driver should be seen as satisfying her/his motives 
in traffic, and there are also so called extra motives influencing driving behaviour. They 
include motives such as emotions, behavioural models, showing off, hedonistic models, 
and risk-taking for its own sake. According to Summala, driving behaviour has a 
cognitive basis, but according to his theory, however, the concepts of risk-taking and 
safe margins are central. Behaviour is assumed to be directly related to the level of 
perceived risk, which is in most cases ‘calculated’ to be zero. So, in normal situations 
the drivers do not feel a risk at all. Safety margin is defined in terms of spatial and 
temporal measurements, and only when the threshold for risk is exceeded, risk 
compensation mechanisms are called into effect to restore the risk to the zero level 
(Summala 1988). 
 
 1.7.2.2.  Information processing models  
 
Cognitive psychology represents the paradigm in psychology today. A primary focus of 
this approach is on memory. The most widely accepted theory is labelled the stage 
theory, based on the work of Atkinson and Shriffin (1968). The focus is on how 
information is stored in memory. According to this theory information is processed and 
stored in three stages: sensory, short-term and long-term memory. In this theory, 
information is thought to be processed in a serial, discontinuous manner as it moves 
from one stage to the next. In addition to the stage theory model of information 
processing, there are three more that are widely accepted: levels-of-processing theory,  
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parallel-distributed processing and connectionistic models as alternatives to the 
Atkinson-Shiffrin’s stage theory. The major proposition of levels-of-processing theory 
is that learners utilise different levels of elaboration as they process information. There 
is a continuum from perception, through attention, to meaning. The theory proposes that 
stimuli capable of activating sensory receptors are permanently stored in memory. 
However, this depends on the levels of information processing and how memory 
functions. According to the parallel-distributed processing model information is 
processed simultaneously by several different subsystems of memory, rather than 
sequentially and serially. The connectionistic model emphasises that information is 
stored in multiple locations throughout the brain in the form of networks of connections: 
the more connections the more likely it is to be remembered (Huitt 2003). Information-
processing models first study human information channel capacity and its limits but 
later the focus on research moved from determining the limits of processing to 
automaticity. 
According to Ranney (1994) the problem of information processing models are that, 
in this context psychologists created experimental techniques using stimuli that were 
abstract, discontinuous, and only marginally real, and as a result, describing and 
explaining such continuous practical tasks such as driving, were eliminated (Ranney 
1994).  
Generally speaking,  the advantages of functional models compared to taxonomies 
are, of course, their faculty to explain human activity and behaviour with the help of 
motives, the limitations of information processing capacity, etc.  instead of only 
described phenomena as taxonomies and typologies  do. 
In driver evaluations the examination of motives is extremely important as our case 
study (V) excellently demonstrates. Similarly, difficulties in information processing 
often are accentuated by stroke, TBI  and diseases affecting the CNS (III). On the other 
hand, examination of motives is only one phase in the procedure of the driver’s 
evaluation, and driving is not limited to information processing only, as our models (fig. 
1, 6) show.    
Motivational models strongly emphasise the self-paced nature of driving. It seems 
that supporters of motivational models diminish the pressure drivers often experience 
from the side of other drivers and road users. This social pressure and prevailing norms  
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are factual matters but are not the only theoretical aspects of the traffic system. And 
pressure and norms really affect decision making at all levels. Therefore, the ability to 
make independent safety-related decisions is one important personality quality to 
examine in driver evaluations.  
From the point of view of activity theory a subject indeed is seen as an active 
decision maker but regulation of activity must be associated with real tasks and goals of  
activity, with driving performance but not with perceived risks. The person’s main 
motive is not going to  be to avoid risks in traffic but to drive a car, to get from one 
point to another.  
Driving a car sets high standards particularly for parallel and continuous 
information processing and regulation. Bruslinsky  (1994) underlines that psyche, as the 
highest regulator of  internal mental and external practical activities, exists as a process. 
From the point of view of driver evaluations this should mean abandonment of cross 
section studies (what) in favour of  process analysis (how). One of the results of this 
kind of study could be a description of individual styles of activity (Merlin 1986 ).  
 
1.8.  Aberrant behaviours  
 
For safety reasons one has to obey traffic rules and regulations. Deviation from rules 
and regulations increases accident risk. There are several classifications of aberrant 
behaviours such as those used in this study (see p. 44). However, the most famous 
classification, described by Reason et al. (1990), identified a three-fold typology of 
aberrant driving behaviours: lapses, errors and violations. The first type, lapses, are 
absent-minded behaviours with consequences mainly for the perpetrator, posing no 
threat to other road users. The second type, errors, are typically misjudgements and 
failures of observation that may be hazardous to others. The third type, violations, 
involve deliberate contraventions of safe driving paractise. Naturally this typology has a 
use in traffic research.  
         For explanation and analysis of accidents Reason (1990) created the ‘Swiss cheese  
model’ that is widely adopted as the model for investigation of accident causation. 
Reason (Reason, J. Human Error. Cambridge: University Press, Cambridge 1990 ) made 
a  key  distinction  between  the  active, operational errors  (‘unsafe acts’)  and the latent 
 34  
(organisational) conditions. Reason (1990) stated that “systems accidents have their 
primary origins in the fallible decisions made by designers and high-level (corporate or 
plant) managerial decision makers” (p. 203). Active errors were therefore seen as 
symptoms or tokens of a defective system. It became the duty of incident investigators 
and researchers to examine the psychopathology of organisations in the search for clues. 
From the point of view of a driver’s evaluation and a driving license Reason’s 
model has only marginal practical value because the focus of Reason’s model is in the 
reliability of the whole system (aviation, manufacturing plant, etc.) while in the context 
of a driving licence the subject is the single person. Reason’s model is system-centred 
while driver evaluations should be  person-centred.  
 
1.9. Theories of reasoned action and planned behaviour 
 
There is a limited number of models which make an attempt to explain and to predict 
human behaviour and activity in a complex environment. Probably the most widely 
cited explanatory theories are the theory of the reasoned action and its successor, the 
theory of the planned behaviour. 
According to the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975) if people 
evaluated the suggested behaviour as positive (attitude), and if they think their 
significant others wanted them to perform the behaviour (subjective norm), this results 
in a higher intention (motivation) and they are more likely to perform the behaviour. 
Importance of significant others to driving behaviour is, particularly in youth, 
undoubtedly a central issue. Limitations of the theory come from the nature of the self 
reporting used to determine subjects’ attitudes. Self reported information is in many 
cases not accurate enough for determining driving ability (e.g. McKenna, Stainer and 
Lewis1991; Lajunen and Summala 2003; Reimer et al. 2005). However, the most 
serious limitation of the theory stems from the assumption that behaviour is under 
volitional control. Automatisms, that are so important in driving, cannot be explained by 
this theory.  
Later Ajzen (1985) introduced the theory of planned behaviour by adding a new 
component to the theory of reasoned action, ‘perceived behavioural control’. According 
to the theory of planned behaviour ‘attitude toward the behaviour’, ‘subjective norm’, 
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and ‘perceived behavioural control’ lead to the formation of a ‘behavioural intention’. 
‘Perceived behavioural control’ does not only affect actual behaviour directly, but also 
affects it indirectly through behavioural intention. Intention is determined by the 
individual’s evaluations of the consequences, by his/her perceptions of normative 
pressure to perform that behaviour, and by the degree of control the individual perceives 
that he/she has over performance of that behaviour.  
By the theory of planned behaviour the attitudes, subjective norms and perceived 
behavioural control predict driving style including speeding, drink-driving, close 
following, and risky overtaking (Lajunen 1997). The model lacks a need(s) – motive(s) 
– goal(s) vector and therefore the ‘system’ is without an energy source (need), and 
without the main regulator of activity (motive-goal).  
Further, driving style, as a special form of activity style, is a personality attribute which 
has to be researched in connection to other personality factors and dimensions.    
From the point of view of driver evaluations, the main limitation of the theory of 
planned behaviour is that it is completely based on cognitive processing. The theory 
overlooks all irrational factors of driving behaviour. However, a very high accident risk 
of young healthy maile drivers clearly shows that risky behaviour depends not only on 
cognitive factors but on emotional and personality factors too. Because driving is only 
partly a cognitive task, the usability of the above-mentioned theories in driver’s 
evaluations is limited.  
 
1.10.  Off-road and on-road  tests as predictors of safe drivers                    
 
The importance of assessment of cognitive factors in the evaluation of driving abilities 
are stressed by many researchers. According to Stutts et al (1998) drivers who scored in 
the lowest 10% on the cognitive tests--Trail Making Test parts A and B, the Short 
Blessed Orientation Memory Concentration test of cognitive impairment, a modification 
of the American Association of Retired Persons 'Reaction Time' test, and a timed 
Traffic Sign Recognition--were approx. 1.5 times more likely to be in crashes than were 
drivers who scored in the highest 10%. According to Lundberg et al (1998) a 
combination of visuoconstructive ability, visuospatial memory and verbal episodic 
memory correctly classified 65.2% of the crash-involved drivers. The findings of 
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Coleman et al indicate that even a brief battery of neuropsychologic tests may be a 
useful component in the routine assessment of fitness to drive (Coleman et al. 2002).  
Klavora et al (2000) found that driving fitness of elderly persons with stroke can be 
assessed with reasonable accuracy using off-road tests, minimising the expense and risk 
associated with on-road assessments in this population, and Lundberg (2003) concludes 
in her thesis that older drivers with demonstrated unsafe traffic behaviour should be 
cognitively assessed, and this should also be the case for older licence holders with 
medical conditions making them susceptible to cause cognitive impairments. Also the 
results of Daigneault et al. (2002) confirm the importance of proper assessment of 
cognitive processes and underscore the potential of measuring executive functions for 
the evaluation of driving competence of elderly persons.  
Hakamies-Blomqvist et al. (1999) note that not even a heavy test battery is 
sufficiently sensitive to driving specific tasks in order to permit or to prohibit someone 
to drive a car. Fairly few studies have tested subjects both in laboratory and real-life 
driving, and most of these studies have used neurological patients as subjects (e.g. 
Galski et al, 1992; Nouri et al. 1987; Brooke et al. 1992; Fitten et al. 1995, Wolffelaar et 
al., 1992) and only a few studies have used healthy persons as subjects (e.g. Risser et al. 
1985; Odenheimer et al.1994). Both laboratory tests and driving tests used in these 
studies varied to a very high degree. Efforts to create a battery of tests to predict the 
ability to drive reliably are still under way (Ranney 1994). Moreover, the research has 
still failed to identify any consistent pattern of neurological, perceptual, cognitive, 
motoric, or neuropsychological deficits that renders a person unfit to drive (Galski et al. 
2000). Only carefully  selected tests  can be used to evaluate  fitness to drive (Galski, 
Bruno and Ehle 1993). Withaar et al. (2000) note that the direct  relationship between 
neuropsychological measures and actual driving performance is questionable. The 
authors point to the multiple determination of the quality of driving performance and it 
is noted that in many studies this has not been taken into account. Tests which 
successfully discriminate between brain damaged and non-brain damaged  patients  are  
not  necessarily  highly  correlated  to  driving  performance  (e.g. van  Zomeren et al. 
1988). Thus, tests serving one purpose (e.g., patient-group classification), are not 
necessarily practical for application to driver evaluations. The need for a screening test  
as a first step instrument in a multi-level evaluation procedure has recently come up. De 
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Raedt and Ponjaert-Kristoffersen (2001a) developed a short screening battery for elderly 
drivers to evaluate the necessity for further referral to specialised centres. A battery 
consists of the Trail Making Test, Part A, a visual acuity test, a clock drawing test, and 
the Mini-Mental State Examination (MMSE). These results highlighted the potential 
value of a short screening instrument that can be used in primary health care settings. 
Furthermore, they noted that, at least to some extent, the predictability of car accidents 
by neurocognitive measurements and a road test increases when the kind of accident is 
specified (De Raedt and Ponjaert-Kristoffersen 2001b).  
The on-road driving evaluation currently is considered the criterion index of fitness 
to drive; however, little information exists regarding the relation between  the on-road 
test, actual driving records, and subjective reports of driving safety (Coleman et al 
2002).  Naturally, the on-road assessments have greater ecological validity than off-road 
evaluations including simulator tests. 
The main problem with driving simulators is their low ecological validity. The 
examinees always know that they are in the simulator test instead of actual on-road 
driving and this consciousness distorts their attitudes and emotions towards the test. The 
extent to which an individual’s performance in the simulator corresponds to actual 
driving behaviour is not well established (Barbas and Wilde 2001). At its best, a driving 
simulator is a good sensorimotor test but the majority of simulators still simulate only 
relatively simple skills of the eye-hand co-ordination.    
 
1.11.  Self-evaluation of driving ability  
 
Drivers tend to overestimate their perceptual-motor and safety skills (e.g. McKenna, 
Stainer and Lewis1991; Lajunen and Summala 2003) and overconfidence in driving 
skills results in a driver's biased sense of control in traffic leading to a high level of risk 
acceptance (Näätänen and Summala 1976). On the whole drivers have a general 
tendency to rate their driving abilities as “above average” (Delhomme 1991; Groeger 
and Brown 1989) and this tendency may be based on infrequent feedback from the 
driving task (Evans 1991). The rarity of accidents and the attribution of blame to outer 
factors (weather and road conditions, the behaviour of other drivers etc.), easily lead 
drivers to overestimate their own driving skills and ability (Reimer et al. 2005). On the 
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other hand driving may be perceived as an overlearnt behaviour, such as an activity of 
daily living, rather than a skill that requires complex cognitive ability (Coleman et al 
2002).  
While healthy people also tend to overestimate their driving skill and ability 
(Lajunen and Summala  2003), this issue is more acute among neurological patients due 
to particular problems, such as denial of symptoms and neglect syndrome. It is well-
known that, e.g., stroke patients may have problems in recognising their own cognitive 
or psychomotor disorders. Particularly damage to the non-dominant hemisphere often 
causes anosognosia and neglect syndrome (Gainotti 1972;  Hier et al.1983). In the in-
person interview study by Marottoli and Richardson all participants of older individuals 
(n = 125) age 77 years and older rated themselves as being average or above average 
drivers compared to others their age, with the majority rating themselves as above 
average (Marottoli and Richardson 1998). Age and experience does not automatically 
improve one’s ability to evaluate his or her driving ability.  
 
1.12. Driving ability in the context of the Finnish law and  
WHO’s ICF  
 
When making pass-fail decisions in the context of a driver evaluation clinicians have to 
act according to law. In the decree (Finnish law 2002) it is said that driving is prohibited 
for persons who lack prerequisites for driving due to disease, defect, handicap, fatigue 
or another corresponding reason  (64 § (3.8.1990/676)). Further, in decree 9 § 
(5.1.1996/2) it is said that a driver does not to have such defect, disease, or handicap 
which significantly impair his or her ability to act as a driver (91/439/ETY).  
The World Health Organisation (1980) draws a clear distinction between 
impairment, disability, and  handicap. Impairment is classified at the level of the organs, 
disability at the level of the individual, and handicap at the level of the social 
environment. This classification encourages health care professionals to examine 
diseases and their consequences in a wider context, that is to say, how they influence 
transportation, communication, living, studying and working (Talo 2001).  
A prospective way of thinking about functional disabilities and restrictions provides 
the WHO’s International Classification of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF) 
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classification as a unified and standard language and framework for describing health 
and health-related states in a bio-psycho-social model (Talo 2001; World Health 
Organization 2001; Tant 2002). The ICF classifies functioning and it supplements the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) which provides an etiological 
framework. In ICF, human functioning is viewed as the outcome of an interaction 
between a person’s physical and/or mental condition and the social and physical 
environment.  
What is an ability to drive from the perspective of the WHO’s ICF classification? In 
terms of the ICF, practical fitness to drive is defined on the activity (formerly  
disability) level, and  is  evaluated  accordingly (Tant 2002). Unfitness to drive is 
therefore conceptually an activity limitation. It is thus recognised that fitness to drive is 
as closely related to learnt driving skills and compensatory behaviours as to medical 
status. This is in contrast to the  traditional medical concept of fitness to drive, which is 
only related to impairments. The on-road test is situated on the activity level, as it is an 
assessment of actual  driving  ability presented by the client. In contrast, medical fitness 
to drive is a decision based on medical information (for example visual acuity or visual 
field extent), not on actual driving performance. Tant (ibid) pointed out that the 
restriction based on medical unfitness to drive bypasses the activity level in the  
framework. Consequently, an ability-to-drive decision should be based on the on-road 
driving test which is an activity level indicator. Using ICF terminology, an interaction 
of lower-order impairment and environmental factors including legal aspects,  results in 
a participation restriction or prospect, namely being refused to drive a car or being 
permitted to acquire a driving license.  
 
1.13.  Résumé of the literature review  
 
af Wåhlberg (2003) writes that the current research into psychological accident 
predictors is fraught with methodological deficiencies: the question of culpability, the 
use of self-reported crash data, crash definitions, the mixing of predictor variables of 
different types (e.g., sex and personality), the lack of replications of many studies, how 
to handle the exposure problem, sub-groupings other than culpability, etc. He says that 
research has been rather individualistic concerning the variables and methods chosen. 
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The search for psychological predictors of accidents has not been very successful. 
Further he asks whether there is really such a thing as stable, measurable individual 
behaviour in the traffic environment, which is the same thing as reliability over time of 
the measurement made. Very few traffic researchers seem to have paid any attention to 
the question of the reliability/stability of their accident predictors, as such calculations 
are seldom reported or discussed. 
Hauer argued (2004) that the pervasive use of tests of significance as statistical 
ritual impedes the accumulation of knowledge and is unfit for use. The uncritical 
application of null hypothesis significance testing  may easily lead to the 
misinterpretation of data and often leads to the subversion of reason and of science. 
Further, use of tests of significance has directed research toward the lower-order 
measurable phenomena. Therefore, less attention has paid to the higher-order factors. 
This ritualistic use of statistical methods as an exclusive scientific criterion has led to 
the situation that there is an ocean of formally correct studies with minor information in 
traffic literature.  
A self-report in a different form is the main traffic research method. However, 
reliance on self-report of driving safety is methodologically questionable because 
patients may have a poor awareness of their deficits and may misrepresent their driving 
behaviour (Coleman et al. 2002). Self-reports are not reliable methods for collecting 
accident related information (McGwin Jr., Owsley and Ball 1998).  
Diseases are often accompanied by psychological denial of their physical and 
mental restrictions or via depression a person may devaluate his or her residual abilities. 
Thus, diseases often distort patients’ self-concept which is the basis of sound self-
evaluation. Risks accumulate when weakened cognitive and sensorimotor functions are 
unified with denial of one’s symptoms or diseases and/or overestimation of one’s 
abilities.  
Generally speaking health plays only a minor role in traffic safety (e.g. Medical 
aspects of fitness to drive 1995) and driving ability is only partly the biomedical object 
of the research. However, traffic literature is abound with epidemiological studies of 
accident causation. The findings of these empirical studies are often contradictory and 
confusing (Ranney 1994), and in general, these studies with the selected groups have 
little to offer a practical driver evaluation with concrete unique individuals. Moreover, 
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Galski et al. (2000) note that there has been misunderstanding concerning the role of 
medical examination in evaluation of driving ability. This misunderstanding is based on 
the incorrect supposition that medical expertise automatically qualifies practitioners to 
evaluate driving ability and leads to overestimation of the role of clinical examination in 
evaluations. Overestimation of the role of clinical examination has led to a groundless 
medicalisation of the evaluation of driving ability. 
In Europe there are no universally agreed upon criteria for invoking the assessment 
process, no standardisation regarding the specific medical conditions requiring 
assessment, no standardisation in the scheduling of the assessment process, no 
universally agreed upon and validated set of tests or tools to measure the functional 
skills necessary for driving, lack of knowledge regarding guidelines and standards 
related to specific driving-relevant functional deficits (Hakamies-Blomqvist, Henriksson 
and Heikkinen 1999; Sommer et al. 2003). Among traffic researchers there is widely 
accepted view that driving ability evaluation procedures are too deficit related. More 
compensation and capacity-related evaluation procedures are needed  (De Raedt and 
Ponjaert-Kristoffersen 2000). In Finland the procedure of an evaluation is disjointed 
depending on the researcher’s individual context and on methods used in evaluations. 
The literature shows that accidents are difficult to predict using off-road tests (for a 
review of performance tests, see Wetherell 1996), and although performance tests have 
been extensively used to predict impaired driving, the validity of these tests is rarely 
studied or even questioned. Further,  
the problem here is that performance in laboratory tests does not necessarily predict 
actual driving performance but a distinction should be made between a person's 
maximum level of skill and how well drivers apply their skills (Näätänen and Summala 
1974, 1976; Summala 1988; Evans 1991; Elander, West and French 1993). It is easy to 
determine the pattern of tests which distinguishes patients from the healthy controls, but 
it is much more a demanding task to determine the tests which distinguish safe drivers 
from unsafe ones.  
Well-known instrumental problems are related to non task specificity of traditional 
psychological tests. Studies with adequate neuropsychological assessment typically lack 
adequate outcome measures for driving safety or have an extremely brief follow-up. 
Often, the tests have been brief, largely neglecting important domains such as executive 
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functioning and the patient’s awareness of deficit (Coleman et al 2002). According to 
Solfrizzi (2002) there are problems defining whether age-related cognitive decline is an 
expression of normal ageing or preclinical dementia. 
Executive functions are undoubtedly of most importance in such a complicated form of 
an activity as driving. Most studies in which neuropsychological assessment was found 
not to be useful for predicting driving safety failed to include measures of higher-order 
executive functioning. (Coleman et al. 2002). These higher-level cognitive functions 
involved in the control and regulation of lower cognitive operations, are clinically 
assessed by a small battery of tests that, on the basis of putative sensitivity to frontal 
damage, are referred to as “frontal.” Support for the validity of this claim is variable. In 
general, modern cognitive neuroscience findings have failed to penetrate clinical 
assessment of executive functions (Stuss and Levine 2002). Thus, there are yet no 
reliable methods for measuring executive functions.  
There is also a surprising lack of widely accepted measures for sustained attention 
(detection of targets over a prolonged time period) in traditional clinical 
neuropsychology. And, though, almost all driving test patterns include a work memory 
test, few widely used tasks seek to directly assess working memory per se. Digit span or 
spatial span tasks are important for determining working memory storage capacity, but 
do not provide information relating to rehearsal or executive control (Stuss and Levine 
2002). Digit span does not measure actual work memory but a volume of short term 
memory.  
The on-road tests are attractive in their seeming ability to address task-specific 
characteristics of driving. However, these tests are also limited in their ability to predict 
actual driving behaviour. Both theoretical and practical concerns have been raised. First, 
there is a limitless number of combinations of traffic situations and therefore it is even, 
in principle, impossible to confirm whether a driver copes with every traffic situation or 
not only using a driving test (Ojala and Meriläinen 2003). Second, on-road driving 
evaluations have also been strongly criticised for lack of objectivity and reliability, 
exemplified in the relatively high accident rates for young  drivers who pass the on-road 
test for licensure and absence of standardisation in conducting on-road evaluations. 
Further, the pass rate on the standard driving test falls steadily with increasing age 
(Galski et al. 2000; Fox et al. 1998). Third, on-road tests are also considered dangerous, 
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often  have unknown reliability and objectivity, and are costly in terms of time, money 
and energy (Galski, Bruno and Ehle 1992; Barbas and Wilde 2001). They require 
expensive equipment and specially trained evaluators, and carry high liability (Klavora 
et al 2000). Fourth, because driving is an overlearnt behaviour, a standard road test may 
be insufficient for uncovering the unpredictable and complex situations in which 
disabled individuals may have the most difficulty. Fifth, driving school teachers are 
used to working with young persons which may bias their evaluations of the older 
drivers.  
A comprehensive model of driving behaviour that predicts both crash-causing 
behaviours and everyday driving has yet not to be developed (Ranney 1994), and it is 
easy to agree with Summala (2005) when he writes that truly functional models which 
predict road user behaviour on road is needed in traffic psychology. 
The main question in the context of driver evaluation is: Who is a driver? 
Surprisingly this question remains without an answer in light of the traffic literature and 
with it there is a lack of a proper basis of the evaluations of driving ability, as well. 
Regardless of generally and officially accepted fact of the significance of the driver for 
road safety, it seems that traffic researchers have practically not systematically studied 
their conception of a human being. However, according to Rauhala there are always 
some preconceptions of the fundamental character of the subject of the research and this 
ontological solution always shall been made. If the researcher does not make this 
ontological solution in regard to Man’s nature, then in the last analysis,  his or her 
hypotheses and research methods dictate this ontological conclusion regarding Man’s 
nature for the researcher  (Rauhala 1978, 1983). This appears to be the case in traffic 
research and the result is that traffic research is predominantly behaviouristic where the 
tasks of the research are mainly human reactions and responses to different stimuli.  
The prevailing behaviourism and functionalism in psychology generally, and 
particularly in traffic psychology, has led to the loss of a real subject of an activity, a 
concrete human being. The subject of activity, a driver, is replaced in traffic psychology 
with his reactions and responses, motivation, cognition, emotion, attentiveness, etc., and 
furthermore, a personality is reduced to some traits or dimensions which are only a few 
variables among others variables. This is a considerable limitation from the standpoint 
of driver evaluation. It  can be concluded that the traffic researchers’ predominant 
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conception of Man bears the stamp of naturalism, mechanism, and fragmentarism and 
by this conception of Man it is impossible to organise a qualified driver’s evaluations.  
Traffic safety claims that the drivers who are clearly dangerous to other road users and 
to themselves have to be excised from traffic as drivers, but on the other hand, one 
should  allow the  possibility to drive to all those disabled persons who have sufficient 
physical and mental qualifications to act as drivers. And, progress in adaptive 
technology affords an ever-increasing number of disabled persons the opportunity to 
succeed as a driver. Therefore, there is a continuous and an increasing need for an 
evaluation of driving ability. A driving licence, regardless of whether we see it as a right 
or privilege, can be forbidden only because of closely argued proof. All disabled 
persons ought to have the possibility for a high-quality evaluation of their driving 
ability.  
Safe driving requires the complex interaction of physical, psychomotor, cognitive, 
emotional, and personality attributes regardless of a driver’s age, sex, driving 
experience and health. So, one can agree that there are some psycho-physiological 
requirements common to all the drivers but it seems that the consensus ends here.  
Ability to drive evaluation procedures need to be clearly defined, however this is 
now not the case. Ranney (1994) noted that there is no comprehensive model of driving 
behaviour, and as far as models of an evaluation of driving ability are concerned the 
situation is possibly even more open and uncertain. Performance tests have been 
extensively used to predict impaired driving (Wetherell 1996), but the research has 
failed to identify any consistent pattern of neurological, perceptual, cognitive, motor, or 
neuropsychological deficits that renders a person unfit to drive (Galski et al 2000). 
Disease-centred studies concerning driving ability abound but, as selected groups, they 
do not represent all the drivers and the findings of these studies cannot be generalised. 
There are no standards for the conduct of driving evaluations, no normative data 
relevant to a person’s performance on individual tests or evaluation as a whole on which 
to base pass/fail decisions and no guidelines for interpretation of test results. Further, 
there has been no consensus among clinicians about which tests and measures should be 
included in a standard assessment nor any accepted guidelines for determining who 
should pass/fail a comprehensive driving evaluation (Galski et al. 2000, see also Barbas 
&  Wilde 2001; Hakamies-Blomqvist et al. 1999; Hopewell 2002). So, there is no 
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consensus about what an evaluation of driving ability has to include and how an 
evaluation has to be carried out.  
The British Psychological Society stated (2001) on neuropsychological deficits and 
ability to drive, that “a complete account of driving would ultimately require a 
comprehensive understanding of the whole of human behaviour in terms of this very 
broad array of variables, which as present are far from complete.” For making this 
possible an evaluator could orient in this ‘very broad array of variables’ the conceptual 
and functional models are needed along with empirical materials.  
 
 46  
 
2  AIMS OF THE STUDY  
 
The general aim is to develop model for practitioners and other professionals, who have 
to take a stand on driving ability of their patients. This is made on the basis of empirical 
materials and psychological activity theory.  
The aim of the study with the young driver school female students and the 
experienced middle-aged male drivers (I, II) was mainly methodological: how off-road 
laboratory tests and on-road driving test work in different driver groups.  
The studies with the patient groups (III, IV) were aimed at showing how concordant 
or discordant the conclusions on the patients’ driving ability made by the different 
evaluators were -- examinees themselves, their spouses, medical doctors, a psychologist,  
an occupational advisor, a driving school teacher  --  on the basis of their knowledge 
and the methods in their use.  
In case study (V) the aim was to describe, in detail by the help of some cases, how 
and on which basis decisions in clinical driver evaluation can be made in the context  of 
the psychological  activity theory.  
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3   STUDY DESIGN, MATERIAL AND RESULTS 
 
3.1.  Study design 
 
Two basically different case-control methodologies have been used to determine the 
relative risk associated with medical conditions. The most common approach is to select 
drivers with a certain condition (cases) and compare their risk with that of drivers 
without the same condition (controls), often matching the cases and controls on 
background factors. The alternative approach is in a way inverse to the first one. Instead 
of selecting cases on the basis of medical diagnosis and estimating their crash 
involvement, cases are selected on the basis of crash involvement, and the prevalence of 
the medical condition among the crash-involved drivers is compared to that of a control 
group (Schlesselman 1982). Our material is of the previous type. 
The study design was the same in the groups of the students, experienced drivers 
and the Parkinson’s disease patients: the same driving school instructor evaluated 
driving ability using the on-road driving test (criterion), to which the evaluations made 
by the specialists and the examinees themselves were compared. Finally all evaluations 
were carried out on a ten-degree scale where the number 10 indicated excellent driving 
ability and the number 4 and below indicated a negative mark concerning the ability to 
drive. Evaluations were conducted without any interaction between the evaluators. In 
the Parkinson group patients’ ability to drive was estimated by the neurologist purely on 
the basis of a clinical examination whereas in the stroke group the neurologist based his 
evaluation on a clinical examination and on the findings of the neurological 
multidisciplinary rehabilitation team. The evaluations of the controls were carried out in 
the same way as the patients’ evaluation except that instead of the neurologist there was 
a vocational rehabilitation counsellor. The psychologist’s estimation of ability to drive 
was based on the test results and an interview; the driving  instructor made estimations 
according to the official driving test used in Finland (1992). The patients (II, III) and 
their spouses (III) also estimated driving ability using the same scale. Furthermore, 
examinees evaluated their own performance in laboratory tests using the scale:  
1 = poor; 2 = fair; 3 = satisfactory and 4 = excellent.  
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The-on-road driving test was not carried out in the stroke group primarily for safety 
reason due to patients’ physical, sensorimotor and cognitive restrictions. Moreover, 
arrangement of the on-road driving test often would have required many individual 
alterations to the car and therefore was out of question in the group's study.  
 
3.2.  On-road and off-road tests  
 
Tant (2002) wrote that the  prognostic validity of even a practical driving test cannot be 
taken for  granted. The judgement given by a driving instructor or traffic expert is 
subjective in nature. To reduce this rater bias in our studies, a structured protocol was 
used. The on-road test  was performed both in urban and rural surroundings on a 
standard and relatively difficult route. The time of day or weather conditions did not 
vary noticeably. The time needed to cover the route was approximately 45 min.  
In the protocol, driving performance is classified into 7 factors: 1) observation, 2) 
speed and its regulation, 3) merging, 4) staying in a lane, 5) obeying driving orders, 6) 
obeying traffic guidance, and  7) keeping a safe distance from other road users. These 7 
factors are observed in 10 traffic situations: 1) start,  2) driving in traffic flow, 
3)changing a lane 4) action in a pedestrian crossing 5) turning to the right 6) turning to 
the left 7) crossing a lane 8) overtaking 9) driving on the highway and  10) 
parking/stopping. Errors in these traffic events were classified into three categories: 
minor errors, significant faults, and serious offences. Handling a car was evaluated 
separately according to the following three point scale: good, satisfactory, and poor. 
Examples of disqualifying driver errors were: driving in oncoming traffic, disobeying 
traffic lights, turn into improper lane, and severe speeding.  
In the first study with students and experienced drivers, all three categories of errors 
– minor errors, significant faults, and serious offences -- were registered. In the 
experienced group a great number of ‘faults’ seems to mean a greater number of 
‘offences’ too (p < 0.01). This connection was not so pronounced in the student group 
but the trend was the same. However,  the ‘minor errors’ did not correlate with ‘faults’ 
or ‘offences’ in the student nor the experienced group. Our results confirmed findings  
that there is not a path from minor ‘errors’ to real risks (Parker et al. 1995; Reason et al. 
1990; Parker et al. 1995; Reimer et al. 2005). Due to lack of a real connection between 
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minor errors and risk-related driving characteristics, minor errors were excluded from 
the later studies.  
Psychological examination included a structured interview and computer aided 
laboratory tests. The laboratory test package varied by the groups so that it was the 
widest in the first study with the students and the experienced drivers but was reduced 
after experience and theoretical analysis and consideration (appendix No 2). The 
briefest test package was in the stroke group where cognitive and psychomotor 
restrictions limited a selection of the tests.  
Although there an almost significant correlation between the simulator tracking task 
and the on-road driving test’s faults, the simulator was excluded because of the law 
ecological validity, and second, it did not bring any additional value to that of an 
information processing test or to the other tests.  
Although the scale of neurosis of the Eysenkc’s test was strongly linked to the faults 
of the on-road driving test (paper I), the Eysenck’s inventory was also excluded because 
in the group of the experienced drivers the results were contradictory. Moreover, the 
scales of Eysenck’s inventory are basically problematic in the context of driving. There 
are quite different requirements for drivers on the highway at night than at rush hours in 
big cities; neuroticism means carefulness, extraversion also means dependence on outer 
stimuli for the maintenance of the level of an activity of the brain. So, at the beginning 
of the study (I and II) there were 119 test variables but the number of variables was 
reduced to 65 on the basis of statistical analysis and deliberation  (the statistical methods 
used in the different studies is demonstrated in appendix No 1). 
Finally five tests were proved to be genuinely driving related: visual short-term 
memory, flexibility of visual perception, vigilance, complex choice reaction test and 
information processing capacity. These were selected for the studies with the 
Parkinson’s disease and stroke patients. However, an information processing test proved 
to be too demanding for most of the stroke patients, and was also excluded from their 
test package.  
 
3.3.  Study subjects  and main findings  
The study groups consisted of the young female student drivers group, experienced 
middle-aged men, two patients groups (stroke and Parkinson), and the cases which 
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illustrate problems met in the practice of evaluating driving ability. The group of the 
middle-aged men with good traffic records served as a control group for the student and 
the patient groups.  
 
3.3.1.  Study I-II: Driving school students and healthy experienced drivers 
 
The studies involving the young and inexperienced female driving school students and 
the experienced middle-aged men was a preliminary one and its aim was not only to 
compare these groups to each other, but also to test and develop an on-road driving test 
as a criterion, and to determine relevant tests for future studies involving disabled 
persons of the different patient groups. All the members of both groups had no traffic 
related health  problems. 
The results of the comparison of young and the middle-aged drivers are surprising 
and paradoxical: with experience the number of serious faults and offences in the on-
road-driving tests increased (see table 1, paper I; table 1, paper II ). The difference in 
the number of the faults is significant (p < .001). The results may be explained by the 
fact that the driving school students are still undergoing a learning period with regard to 
driving, and therefore they experienced the on-road driving test as a challenging task. 
This is reflected in their driving style and attitudes: They drove as well as they could. 
On the other hand the experienced drivers have fallen into routines and conform to the 
"everyday" rules of traffic rather than to the written regulations. Therefore skill-related 
laboratory tests predicted actual driving to be worse in the group of experienced drivers 
than in the inexperienced drivers who tried to drive as well as they could.  
In the student group there was a clear connection between skills of handling a car 
and ‘faults’ (p < 0.001) whereas this is lacking in the experienced group. Uncertainty 
and lack of practice in handling a car seems to increase the number of dangerous ‘faults’ 
of perception and decision making. For the inexperienced drivers handling a car is still a 
challenging task, whereas for experienced drivers manoeuvring a car is largely 
automated (e.g. Summala 1996; Keskinen et al. 2000).  
Along with experience, automated routines allow some deviations from traffic rules 
in the name of flexibility (Duncan et al 1991; Lajunen and  Summala 1995). Thus, we 
can suppose that the students’ driving performance corresponded to their real skill level 
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whereas the outcome of the driving tests of the experienced drivers rather reflected their 
affective-motivational dimensions, attitudes, tendency to overestimate their own driving 
skills, and tendency to underestimate the driving test (Näätänen and Summala 1976). 
Personality factors seem to be even more influential in  driving  compared to skills in 
the groups of experienced drivers. It is noteworthy that most persons needing the 
thorough driver evaluation are experienced drivers and in this group the style factors are 
underlined. 
Our results show that ‘faults’ and ‘offences’ belong to the same group of the 
phenomena. One can suppose that faults, offences and accidents form a pyramid where 
faults are at the bottom, offences or conflicts in the middle, and accidents on the top.  
The most suitable variable for evaluations of driving ability seems to be faults, i.e., quite 
serious mistakes. Offences are naturally important for evaluations, but as a rare event, 
they have the same well-known limitations as accidents as a criterion have (see, 
Näätänen and Summala 1976), whereas minor errors seem to be related rather to 
automated routines than with safety.  
In the novice group, Eysenck’s neuroticism scale is significantly connected (p < 
0.01) and the psychotism scale is moderately (p < 0.05) connected to the driving test’s 
faults. Further, in the same group the lie scale is significantly connected (p < 0.01) and 
the extroversion scale is moderately (p < 0.05) connected to the  offences of the driving 
test. In the experienced drivers group there were no significant connections between the 
questionnaire scales and the on-road driving test variables. Moreover, some correlations 
were completely opposite in these two groups. Thus, although there were some 
significant correlation between Eysenck’s Personality questionnaire and the on-road 
driving test, these connections were mixed and confused and they appeared only in the 
novice group.  
The main findings of these studies are, first, that on-road driving can be explained 
by the skill-related cognitive and sensorimotor laboratory tests more exhaustively in the 
novice group than in the experienced drivers group, and second, faults in the laboratory 
tests predicted faults in the on-road driving test in the novice group whereas slowness in 
the laboratory predicted driving faults in the experienced drivers group.  
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3.3.2.  Study III: Parkinson group (PD) 
 
In the PD group the disease indicators such as duration of the disease, the Hoehn and 
Yahr scale and MMSE were not driving related and the medication (Levodopa) had 
only a weak connection with the on-road driving test. Further, in the PD group there 
was no connection between annual mileage or the total mileage or the on-road driving 
test results.  
In the on-road driving test the PD patients committed significantly more risky faults 
(p < 0.05) and offences (p < 0.01) than the controls did. Problems appeared above all in 
urban areas but the patients and controls did not differed from each other in highway 
driving.   
The laboratory tests – particularly the information processing capacity test --  
unambiguously distinguished PD patients from controls; the differences being most 
significant in the number of the correct, correct and within the time correct responses in 
the information processing test (p < 0.0001), in the number of correct responses in the 
choice reaction test (p < 0.001) and in the visual memory test’s latencies (p < 0.01). 
Slowness and correctness in the information processing test (correct and within the 
given time responses) have a very significant connection (p < 0.001) with offences in 
the on-road test. Consequently, serious offences and conflicts in the road seem to be 
linked especially to cognitive slowness in the PD group.  
In the patient group the connection between the laboratory test and the driving test’s 
faults was the most pronounced in the visual perception test (correct responses, p < 
0.001), and in the information processing test (omitted stimuli, p < 0.001). Just a bit 
looser, but still very significant, was the connection between the faults and correct 
responses in the vigilance test (p < 0.01) and in the choice reaction test (p < 0.01). Both 
correctness and quickness in laboratory tests predicted success in the on-road driving 
test in the PD group evaluated by the number of the risky-faults.  
A neurologist’s evaluations of the patients suffering from PD was based on clinical 
observations and they were significantly more optimistic than the driving instructor’s 
evaluations (p < 0.001) and psychologist’s ones were based on the interview and the 
laboratory test (p < 0.001). There was no connection between the evaluations of the 
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neurologist and the instructor, nor between the neurologist and the psychologist 
evaluations, whereas neurologist and the patient evaluations were similar, strongly 
overestimated in light of the criterion.   
Our study with PD clearly showed that evaluating a disabled persons’ driving 
ability is such a complicated task that even an experienced clinician cannot accomplish 
it without the support of other specialists and driving-related methods. 
 
3.3.3.  Study IV: Stroke group 
 
In the stroke group age, driving experience and duration of the onset were not connected 
with the laboratory tests. A low score in the Scandinavian Stroke Scale (SSS) and in the 
Barthel Index (BI) scale were associated with the wrong responses in the vigilance test 
(p < 0.01). Thus, these questionnaires were sensitive to the patients’ inattention problem 
caused by monotony and a low-stimuli situation. Attentiveness and vigilance is a 
necessary condition for many ADL functions, and on the other hand, ADL functions, of 
course, tell us something about a person’s possibilities to act as a driver.  
The neurologist and the traffic psychologist both independently estimated 60 
percent (12 out of 20) of the stroke patients as being incapable of driving whereas the 
patients themselves evaluated only 10 percent (2 out of 20), and the spouses 25 percent 
(5 out of  20) being incapable of driving. Neither the neurologist’s nor the 
psychologist’s evaluations were correlated with the patients’ own evaluations which 
were very optimistic (mean 7.2 ± 1.8 in the 10-point estimation scale) as were the 
evaluations of the spouses (6.2 ± 2.3) compared to the neurologist’s (4.8 ± 1.9) and the 
psychologist’s evaluation(4.3 ± 2.5). The neurologist’s and psychologist’s evaluations 
were along the same lines (p < 0.001), the hit rate of evaluations being  75%. So, the 
patients systematically overestimated their driving ability compared to the instructor’s 
and the psychologist’s evaluations.  
Variation in views regarding stroke patients’ driving ability was wide as it was in 
the PD group.  
There were only two cases in which all four evaluators agreed on the subjects disability 
to drive. In four cases the psychologist and neurologist considered the examinee as 
being unable to drive but both the patients and their spouse considered the examinee as 
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being able to drive. The patients had a tendency to overestimate both their laboratory 
performance and driving ability. 
Because driving has many elements of time pressure, slowed information 
processing can be a problem, particularly in extreme situations (Brouwer et al 2002). 
This was the case in our stroke group. In our study the laboratory tests efficiently 
distinguished the stroke patients from the controls especially by sensorimotor tasks 
(table 2, study III). Our stroke patients were very significantly slower (p < 0.001) in 
visual perception and they responded markedly slower in the visual memory task (p < 
0.01) compared to  the controls. The number of the correct responses in the choice 
reaction test was also markedly lower in the patient group compared to the control 
group.  
The results of the non-dominant hemisphere group (NDHD) were inferior to those 
of the dominant hemisphere group (DHD) in every variable of the driving related tests. 
However, the groups differed significantly from each other only in the visual memory 
test: DHD patients responded both faster (p<0.05) and more reliably (p<0.05) than 
NDHD patients. So, the visual memory test was the most sensitive method for the 
localisation of the damage at the level of cerebral hemispheres.  
Patients with a non-dominant hemisphere lesion have more problems in driving 
related cognitive and sensorimotor functions.  
In the stroke study the clinician using all the materials of the neurological 
rehabilitation team evaluated driving ability of his patients in the same way as the 
psychologist did using the task-specific laboratory tests and driving related interview.  
Stroke patients form one of the most important groups needing a multidisciplinary 
team evaluation.  From a safety and  practical point of view, stroke patients’ driving 
ability has to be normally assessed without a behind-the-wheel driving test but a 
decision regarding driving ability has to be made solely on the basis of laboratory tests 
and a driving related interview. Tests used in the evaluation of the stroke patients’ 
driving ability have to be sufficiently difficult and versatile including at least the tests of 
visual perception, vigilance, visual short term memory, choice reaction and, if possible, 
information processing (both parallel and sequential) capacity in a complex situation.  
Measures of a reduced speed of mental processing were found to be the most 
discriminating variables for driving. In particular, the patients had limitations in speed 
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and flexibility of visual processing, which is one of the basic functions needed in 
driving. Thus, stroke is a clear risk factor in traffic, and driving ability should always be 
evaluated after a stroke.  
 
3.3.4.  Study V: Case study 
 
An analysis of motives reveals what an activity it is question about; what is the leading 
activity? Our ultimate motives very often remain subconscious and the existence of 
extra motives (Näätänen and Summala 1976) is a matter concerning all drivers but not 
only younger ones to which they are most often linked. An ‘extra motive’ is extra only 
to an outside observer. For the driver it is always a genuine impetus, moving force, of 
an activity. Often driving is just a means to reach something important which has 
nothing to do with moving from point A to point B. The fact that the ultimate motive 
often is not conscious, doesn't necessarily mean anything to safe driving, but if driving 
performance is actually directed by delusions or hallucinations, as was a case in our 
study, then there is a sufficient reason to intervene in the matter. A person suffering 
from delusions or having hallucinations has no place in traffic as a driver. In our case 
the examinee’s ability to understand the inner and the outer realities was insufficient, 
whereas the level of operations was intact. A motive defines the activity and distorted 
motives can even be the exclusion criterion for driving as in cases of mentally 
handicapped persons. Due to incorrect motives the structure of an activity can be broken 
up not only in cases of psychosis but, e.g., in frontal lobe syndromes too. 
A high education level, as our case study shows, may easily mislead practitioners 
and clinicians especially when they are working without the help of special research 
methods. In the clinical examination the covered mental deficiencies are difficult or 
even impossible to determine.  In this case it was of central importance to uncover the 
significant contradiction between the examinee’s apparent coherent behaviour in the 
interview and his tested cognitive and motor functions. 
From a safety standpoint it is not appropriate that a driver’s limited mental capacity 
is bound by lower-level operations. If a driver has to focus too much on operations 
when driving they become the real goal of performance instead of proper and safe goal-
directed driving. This is often the case in stroke and TBI patients. One stroke patient in 
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our case study was evaluated as being unable to drive because a large number of 
previous operations were raised to the level of conscious actions due to general mental 
and cognitive regression. Now operations significantly loaded cognitive capacity when 
the examinee’s capacity to learn was markedly reduced.  
In another case (a middle-aged man, who as the result of an inborn anomaly, lacks 
their left hand completely and whose  right hand is a short stump with one single finger) 
all the deficiencies were found to be on the level of operations while all higher level 
mental functions were intact. It was concluded that the examinee had all personal, 
cognitive, and motor presuppositions to act as a driver. In the previous evaluations he 
was prohibited to drive due to these striking physical restrictions. Possibilities to 
compensate for physical restrictions with the help of good cognitive capacity and the 
flexible personality were ignored.  
We all are in some degree blind in regard to ourselves and therefore it is unrealistic 
to suppose that all the handicapped and disabled drivers, even in principle, were able to 
correctly decide when it is time for them to stop driving a car. This was seen in the both 
patient groups as it was in the cases. Often they consider themselves as good drivers 
even when they have massive driving related neurological and neuropsychological 
deficiencies.  
Relatives have significant information regarding the patient’s driving history, and in 
our experience, children often were the initiators in making referrals to a driving 
evaluation. They also had a realistic view of their parents’ driving ability. If possible, 
the relatives of the patient should always be included in the procedure of an evaluation. 
Families may be invaluable in helping the person to accept the negative conclusion 
concerning his or her driving ability. Coleman writes that the bases on which significant 
others form their opinions are particularly important in affecting the safety of these 
patients and others who share the road with them (Coleman et al. 2002).  
According to Withaar  (2000) “fitness to drive implies three criteria: to have the 
perceptual, cognitive and motor abilities needed to drive a car; to have a weak 
probability of loosing control suddenly and unpredictably during driving and to have the 
needed social responsibility (attitudes) and social judgement during driving”. In our 
case study one examinee did not meet any of these requirements. Nevertheless, he 
regarded himself as a good and safe driver. There are, in clinical practice, many persons 
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of this kind who definitely need a thorough driver evaluation and who must stop 
driving. On the other hand, their evaluation is usually problem-free because their 
inability to drive is easy to prove.  
 
3.4.  Summary of empirical materials   
 
Summarising the empirical material we can first note that in the student groups mistakes 
predicted mistakes when in the experienced group slowness in the laboratory predicted 
mistakes on the road. Second, the students' performance reflected their skill level while 
the experienced drivers applied their normal driving style which does not necessarily 
comply with all traffic rules to every detail. Third, both stroke and Parkinson's patients 
significantly overestimated their driving ability compared to the evaluations of the 
experts. Fourth, in the PD group disease indicators including medication had no 
connection with the on-road driving test whereas many of the laboratory tests were 
driving related: flexibility of visual perception, information processing capacity, 
vigilance, and choice reaction time were associated with faults during the on-road test. 
Both correctness and quickness in laboratory tests predicted success in the on-road 
driving test in the PD group. In the stroke group the poor scores on the SSS and on the 
BI were associated with vigilance problems and therefore they were also indirectly 
associated with driving. Lesions of the non-dominant hemisphere affect driving related 
abilities more than those in the dominant hemisphere. Fifth, even an experienced 
clinician cannot evaluate reliably patients’ driving ability on the basis of an interview 
and medical findings whereas a neurological rehabilitation team seems to be a reliable 
evaluator. Sixth, spouses are not reliable evaluators but they may be an important 
informant and they can help a person to accept the prohibition of driving. Seventh, 
faults and offences seem to belong to the same group of the higher-level phenomena. 
Eigth, both mental and technical compensation possibilities are wide at the level of 
operations whereas deficiencies in the level of higher-level actions often caused 
inability to drive. 
Case studies brought something significant into focus that statistical studies cannot 
do. The real cases clearly showed deficiencies of the narrow evaluation methods and the 
frames and compel us to develop our own conceptual model. The views about driver 
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evaluation presented here are based  specifically on our empirical studies and cases, 
practise on the whole.  
The important conclusion which one can draw from our empirical materials is that a 
reliable evaluation of driving ability of the disabled persons on the basis of health 
information and clinical interview is not possible to carry out.  
Although there are correlation between laboratory tests and an on-road driving test, 
an evaluation cannot rely only on laboratory measures because especially the 
experienced drivers – the main group of driver evaluations --  do not drive according to 
their maximum cognitive and sensorimotor potentials, but rather how they are 
motivated and used to driving. Personality qualities define how the skills are used by the 
person. 
Our examinees, particularly stroke patients, had severe health restrictions which are 
clearly manifested in poor laboratory results. However, in the practise of clinical driver 
evaluations the patients’ restrictions are mostly not so prominent and one cannot make 
conclusions regarding driving ability on the basis of  exceptionally poor laboratory 
measures, as was the case in our patient groups. It is seldom that the final outcome can 
be based merely on laboratory test results.  
Besides motives and over-learnt routines there are also other intermediaries between 
laboratory measures and driving test measures which may seriously affect everyday 
driving. They are such personality and cognitive factors as self-concept, self-esteem, 
emotional stability/instability, adaptation to one’s physical and mental restrictions, 
recognition of one’s own limitations and resources etc.  
In the stroke and TBI groups there are, due to functional restrictions, significant 
limitations in laboratory methods which can be used.  
Our findings confirm the conclusion of Freund et al (2005) that elderly drivers 
assign high ratings to their driving performance, even in the presence of suspected skill 
decline. Further, the patients were also not able to evaluate their own laboratory 
performance sufficiently reliably and most of all they had problems in the evaluation of 
their capacity for paying attention. The discrepancy between the norm data and the 
patients’ view is very prominent. Their mean z-score indicates that 98 % of the general 
population performs better than patients while the patients themselves thought they 
managed well in the vigilance test. This may result from the apparent ease of the 
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vigilance test, and obviously driving a car is considered by stroke patients as being easy 
to manage as well. Patient's relatives are also most often not reliable evaluators.  
For a high-quality evaluation,  evaluators need substantial knowledge about driving 
performance and special driving-related research methods. The procedure used in our 
empirical studies proved to be passable but in order to meet the requirements of the 
systems analysis, the proper conceptual model of  the drivers and driving is needed.        
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4  DRIVING A CAR IN THE CONTEXT OF ACTIVITY  
    THEORY 
 
In traffic literature there is a widely used dichotomy of driving skill-driving style 
(Elander et al. 1993) which corresponds to the driving performance-driving behaviour 
dichotomy (Evans 1991), where performance refers to what drivers are capable of 
doing, while behaviour refers to what drivers actually do on the road (Näätänen and 
Summala 1976; Shinar 1978; Evans 1991). This dichotomy is, of course, very useful 
and of most importance to traffic research. However, the major problem of empirical 
traffic psychology is that there a clear enough distinction has not been made between an 
animals’ behaviour and man’s activity. Therefore empirical human research is still 
predominantly behaviouristic, and study design directly or indirectly follows a stimulus-
response (S-R) pattern originally created for the examination of  conditional reflexes of 
animals. Here the distinction between behaviour and activity is underlined. 
A human being fundamentally differs from an animal in many respects: a person 
has self-consciousness, only people can set themselves conscious goals, people can 
transmit cultural  heritage and historical achievement to the next generations. More 
concretely: when moving in the environment a person does react to stimulus as an 
animal does but rather acts with material and mental objects, a person does not only 
have to adapt to the environment but, if necessary, changes it to one that is suitable to 
them. A person lives in the world of historically developed artefacts where they orient 
themselves with the help of material and mental signs.  
Behaviour is a series of motor reactions: it is perceptible movements, expressions, 
gestures and voice, etc. It is a visible part of an interaction between an organism and an 
environment, whereas human activity ( tätigkeit, dejatel’nost) applies exclusively to a 
human being. Activity has a social and historical basis (Bruslinkij 1994; Rubinshtein 
2003) and it is an object-oriented, artefact-mediated and socially formed system (Bedny 
and Karwowski 2004).  
The psychological theory of activity, mainly its Rubinshteinian line, has been, from 
the very beginning (see paper I), one of the main components of the undersigned’s 
theory-in-use (Argyris 1976) despite my own experience as a clinical and traffic 
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psychologist. The frame of reference described below partly directed the carrying out of 
the empirical studies: partly it is the result of those studies.  
 
4.1.  Rudiments of activity theory  
 
Activity theory is a theoretical framework for studying different forms of human praxis. 
It is a theory with a high level of generality that can be applied in different domains. 
Activity theory was developed as a psychological theory, but now attracts a wide 
audience of specialists including philosophers, anthropologists, educators, and linguists 
(Bedny and Karwowski 2006).  
Basov as early as in 1931 suggested replaicing the notion of behavior with the 
notion of deytel’nost, which is best translated into English as “activity”(Bedny and 
Karwowski 2006). The psychological theory of activity (Abul’hanova-Slavskaja 1980a, 
1980b; Asmolov 1983, 1986; Bedny and Karwowski 2004; Bruslinkij 1987, 1991, 1992, 
1994;  Ivanova 1987; Lektorsky 1990; Lomov 1979, 1981, 1984, 1986; Solntseva 1987; 
Wertsch 1976), originates in works of Rubinshtein (1959, 1989, 2003) and Leontjev 
(1978, 1981). Vygotsky developed a sociocultural determinism of mind, but not of 
object-oriented, socially mediated, individual activity. Sociocultural theory and activity 
theory share some features, but are not regarded as the same (Bedny and Karwowski 
2004). This is a generally shared view among Russian scientists (e.g. Lomov 1984; 
Yaroshevsky 1985) and it differs from the Western understanding of the identity of 
sociocultural theory and activity theory (Engestrom 2000). While Engestrom, in his own 
theory of developmental work research, (1995) aspires to multi-voicesness (Engestrom 
1991), he grows away from the principles and views of classical psychological theory of 
activity. In the dissertation at hand we try to stay firmly in the way marked by classics 
of the activity theory. 
Activity determines the specificity interaction of conscious subjects with the external 
world. During this interaction, human mental processes evolve (Bedny and Meister 1997; 
Bedny and Karwowski 2006). From this follows the unity of consciousness and activity. 
Rubinshtein formulated this fundamental principle of activity theory, the unity of 
consciousness and activity, as early as 1922 (Rubinshtein 1986, 2003).  
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The term activity refers to human mobilisation around conscious goals in a concrete, 
external world. Inasmuch as only humans can establish conscious goals, only humans can 
be the subjects of activity. This emphasis on conscious goals in activity theory implies  that 
human activity develops less from human biology, than from human history and culture 
(Bedny and Karwowski 2004). Behaviour is a biological concept whereas activity is a 
historical and cultural one. According to activity theory, the human mind develops from 
historically contextualized, object-practical activity (Bedny et al. 2001). Conscious goal-
directed activity determines the genesis and structure of human psyche (Leontjev 1978). 
Rubinshtein (2003) underlines that a human being not only expresses him/herself in an 
activity but psyche is forming and developing during activity too. A human being is a 
cause and effect of himself/herself by way of his or her activity (Rubinshtein 1959). So, 
activity is inextricably linked with internal psychological processes and consciousness. In 
activity cognition, behaviour and motivation are integrated and organised by the 
mechanism of self-regulation toward achieving a conscious goal (Bedny and Karwowski 
2004).  
Activity is always an activity of some concrete person or persons. A subject of an 
activity can be an individual or a collective set of individuals. There is no subjectless 
activity nor a subject of an activity without a conscious goal (Heikkilä 1997, 1998). 
Activity is characterised by any form of subject-object relations, regardless of the vector 
of direction, and whether the object is situated inside or outside of the subject (Lomov 
1984). The object of an activity refers to an object that has been modified by the subject 
according to the required goal of activity. And objects, which may be either material or 
ideal, determine the nature of human actions. (Bedny and Karwowski 2006).  The 
activity is social by its very nature and it is directed towards object (material or ideal) 
and it is mediated by artefacts (tools, language, schemata etc.). Strongly simplified, one 
can define a process of a subject’s activity as a movement from the goal to the result by 
the help of the mental or material means. According to Tikhomirov (1984) the goal is 
considered a conscious mental representation of a future result connected with a motive. 
Goals are cognitive, informational components of activity (Bedny and Karwowski 
2006). 
In the frame of the psychological activity theory a human being is not studied in an 
S-R environment but in the world of objects where he or she is living as an active 
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player. An object of the research of driving performance shall not be reactions but 
actions and an activity. Further, the object towards a human activity is directed is 
historically developed (Leontjev 1978). Driving a car has its history too and without 
understanding this history it is impossible to understand driving now.  
An activity is a holistic process of interaction between a human being and his/her 
environment and an aim of activity is not only adaptation to an environment -- as it is 
seen in the frame of behaviour -- but also an active influence on surroundings by the 
help of the mental and cultural tools (Vygotskij 1978). As distinguished from 
physiological reactions any human activity and even its very simplest actions always 
contain some psychological elements and an activity is regulated from the very 
beginning by these psychological elements (Rubinshtein 2003).  
A system is a set of interdependent elements that is organised and mobilised around 
a specific purpose or goal (Bedny, Seglin and Meister 2000). This is the case in such a 
human activity as driving. Activity theoretical research is a systemic approach too. The 
structural or systemic-structural approach may also be used when the structure of the 
activity system is underlined as in Leontjev (Heikkilä 1997, 1998). From the systemic-
structural perspective, activity can be definend as a goal-directed system, in which 
cognition, behavior, and motivation are integrated and organized by a mechanism of 
self-regulation toward achieving as conscious goal (Bedny and Meister 1997). Any 
activity has recursive loop structure, organized according to the principles of self-
regulation in which feedback mechanisms that evaluate performance are decisive 
(Anokhin 1962; Bernstein 1966; Bedny and Karwowski 2006). 
During activity human create artificial objects that are a necessary precondition for 
the development of internal cognitive processes. The inner mental world of human 
beings is not naturally given, but mediated by artificial objects produced from human 
activity (Rubinshtein 1935; Leont’ev 1947). So, activity is a multidimensional and 
multifaceted system, which should be considered to be historically developed, socially 
formed and culturally mediated.  
The concept of mediation is of most importance to the theory of activity. Human 
activity is mediated by a number of tools, culturally established instruments, both 
external and internal (Vygotskij 1978). The purpose of those tools is to help people to 
regulate, to control and to develop their own activity. Physical tools such as vehicles 
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extend our physical abilities while psychological tools like concepts and  inner models 
extend our mental abilities. Driving a car is a good example of a cultural product. The 
artefacts mediating driving include signs, schemata, inner models, instruments, aids, etc.   
Artefacts are there for us when we are introduced into a certain activity, but they are 
also a product of our own activity, and as such they are constantly changing through the 
activity. During a driving activity the rules, an environment and a vehicle are given 
whereas a driver’s inner models and mental tools constantly develop with experience. 
And these inner models and mental tools are the main subject of a driver’s evaluation. 
Further, these models and tools are constantly changing and develop with a changing 
activity. So, the subject of our study is really dynamic.  
There is two approaches to the study of activity. One may be considered through 
individual psychological perspectives and the other in terms of cultural-historical 
perspectives. The first approach considers activity to be an attribute of individuals under 
which the individual is an agent of activity. The second approach points toward a 
formulation of activity not only as an individual trait but as normative standards for 
activity that transcend separate individuals. In this latter perspective one emerges not so 
much as an agent but as a subject adjusting and adapting to the normative standards and 
requirements of activity (Schedrovitsky 1995, Bedny and Karwowski 2004). When a 
driver begins the activity of driving, the minimum factors involved are: an instrument, 
i.e.,  a vehicle, an environment, and traffic regulations. The task of a driver is first to 
absorb this historically developed form of an activity. This is a subject of driving 
schools. And traffic -- a vehicle, environment and traffic rules -- are now quite different 
compared to those of some 50 years ago. Consequently, the requirements for driving are 
quite different now than, say, 50 years ago and in the future the requirements for drivers 
will constantly change. In order to draw a general view of driving a car as a social-
practical form of human activity, both individual and cultural-historical approaches are 
needed. In driver’s evaluation, however, individual psychological perspectives are of 
most imortance.  Ontologically the most important points associated with activity theory 
are, first, that activity theory does not allow a subject of activity, in our context a driver, 
to be reduced to a reaction machine, an information processor, a risk calculator or some 
other narrow, one-dimensional aspect, but a subject has to be considered as a real person 
of his/her activity. Second, a subject is thought to act in the world of objects instead of 
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stimuli. Third, activity is at its core always social and mediated by cultural and mental 
tools whereas behaviour is a biological frame of a human being. Fourth, activity has to 
be seen as a constantly developing system. Fifth, the main element, a system organiser 
(Judin 1978),  is always the subject of activity, in our context of study, a driver.  
Regardless of the major importance of the concept of activity, one has to remember 
that psyche is not equal to activity (Lomov 1984). The category of activity has to be 
considered together with other basic categories such as a personality, reflection, self-
regulation and social interaction.    
 
4.2.  Unit of analysis  
 
When we study the procedural components of activity, the selection of proper units of 
activity is decisive (Bedny and Karwowski 2006). Meaning and signs as a result and 
tools of activity cannot be an unit of analysis of activity (Rubinshtein 1958; Leont’ev 
1977) nor can the activity be simultaneously the object of study and an unit of this study 
(Lomov 1984; Heikkilä 1997, 1998). 
The main prerequisite for choosing the unit of analysis, is that the selected unit 
retains the features of the whole (Rubinshtein 1958; Vygotsky 1962). Such a unit is 
action (Rubinshtein 1958; Leont’ev 1997). Actions are derived from particular motives 
and are directed toward a specific goal of action (Bruslinsky 1987). So, the final goal of 
activity has to be distinguished from the intermediate goals of actions. Action fulfils an 
intermediate subgoal of activity. Consequently motives of each action and overall 
motivation for the activity must be distinguished. They may or may not coincide 
(Platonov 19872). The goal of action should be distinguished from the goal of a task or 
an activity in general (Bedny and Karwowski 2006).  
An unit of an analysis of driving activity and driving ability has to be  one that is 
high-order enough because lower-order elementary level factors do not include 
psychological elements necessary for regulation and control of driving and then they do 
not have a real relation to driving activity.  Therefore, according to an activity theory 
the unit of an analysis of driving activity has to be an action but not an operation. An 
action because it has a real connection to a goal and motive of driving.  
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The on-road test used in our studies produces just action level driving events and as 
actions they have a real link to driving performance as a human form of activity. In 
handling a car the matter is operations, i.e., the lowest level of the elements in human 
activity. Problems met at this level often can be solved by technology, even in severe 
cases. 
 
4.3.  Functional model of driving a car  
 
Hakkarainen (1989) writes that “the study of human activity is complicated, because the 
object of study cannot be immediately observed. Only elements and their immediate 
relations can be observed”. Therefore an activity like driving can be understood and 
evaluated only with the help of a  model.  
From the point of view  driver evaluation, a substantial failing of traffic literature is 
the lack of a distinctly defined subject. Therefore the particular aim of this study is to 
model the subject of driving, a driver. On the other hand, a driver’s potentials and 
limitations have to be able to be compared to requirements of the driving tasks. So, the 
functional model includes both the driver and the driving subsystems using a 
hierarchical structure. In an evaluation of driving ability it is a question of matching  
these two hierarchically organised systems: the subject of performance and the 
performance itself (figure 1.). 
In the process of activity there is always a moment of  creativity (Rubinshtein 
2003). Therefore human activity is highly dynamic process and the functional model 
one has also to understand as a set of function blocks which are used variously 
depending on internal and external conditions of activity and on the results self-
regulation. So, the number of blocks is constant, but their content and degree of 
involvement in driving activity varies case by case.  
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Figure 1. The macro-level functional model of driving activity.       
 
The blocks are the subject of activity, reflection of internal subjective and external 
objective conditions of activity, planning, decision making, realisation and regulation of 
driving 1. 
 
 
4.3.1.  Subject of an activity 
 
The main question of the study is: Who is a driver? By nature a human being is a bio-
social being (Yarosevsky 1974,1976). However, one has to underline that a subject of 
activity is not psyche but a human being who has needs to satisfy, who has 
psychological processes and qualities, a human being who acts and interacts with other 
people. The subject of activity, here a driver, is viewed as a multisystemic hierarchically 
                                                 
1 Subject- subject relations are not presented in the model. 
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organised bio-social creature  where psyche is the main regulator of human activity and 
behaviour (Lomov 1984). An individual who performs in accordance with conscious 
goals and tasks embedded in the goals, is the subject of an activity. The subject is an 
agent with accumulated historical and social experience (Bedny and Karwowski 2006). 
In driving a car drivers represents themselves as a social being and development of 
driving activity is mainly determined by the society, not by an individual driver. On the 
other hand, development  of a subject of an activity depends on a driver him/herself and 
on the driving education system as well.  
The subject of driving is the  holistic multilevel and multisystemic human being 
where the level of personality is the leading and dominant factor, according to Judin 
(1978), the formator of  the system. In this sense a driver evaluation is, at its core, a 
personality examination. Personality always appears in human activities (Rubinshtein 
2003) but it is not a product of an activity. By the process of objectivation a personality 
gives to an activity its personal form (Abulhanova-Slavskaja 1980). And personality 
factors associated with accident risk are highly constant as Häkkinen (1958, 1979) 
clearly showed in his follow-up studies.   
An organism, a temperament, individuality and a personality form a unity of 
viewpoints on a human being. Individuality is seen as the core of a personality forming 
its uniqueness. This unity contains both the formal-dynamic and content aspects. In the 
model an organism and a temperament represent the former and an idividuality and a 
personality the latter aspect (Heikkilä 1995a, 1995b, 1996). These subsystems are 
relatively independent and  quite different laws and principles act at the biological level 
than work at the levels of personality and individuality. An organism, and partly 
temperament, as biologically-based, formal-dynamic aspects, are relatively stable and 
measurable systems, whereas a socially determined and constantly developing 
personality and an individuality can only be evaluated and described in the context of 
the activities of other people and society.  
The place to become a real subject of his or her driving activity is in the above 
mentioned multilevel hierarchical structure of  the human being. A safe driver is an 
active, conscious subject of his or her own driving activity; a subject who adheres to 
established rule-governed behaviours established for the safety of one's self and others 
(Reimer et al. 2005). Being a subject of his/her activity means that a person consciously 
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acts within his/her capabilities. Becoming a subject is an inner movement of the 
elements of a multilevel and multi-systemic structure and a distribution of energy and 
power between the subsystems (Heikkilä 1994, 1995a, 1995b). The more cognisant 
subject a driver is, the more reliable he/she is as a driver.  
 
4.3.1.1. An organism and biological limits and potentials of a man  
 
On the level of an organism, a human being is considered as a representative of the 
species Homo Sapiens. This categorisation defines the levels of physiological potentials, 
anatomical characteristics, sensory capacity, health condition and other biological 
factors common to humans.  
Here the limits and potentials of a human kind’s functional capacity are defined.  
By biological nature a human being is a slowly moving diurnal animal with senses 
and reaction speeds intended for the speed of walking or a running (Laaksonen 1991). 
In driving we artificially exceed our biological limits and from this point of view 
accidents are a quite normal result of a performance which is against our nature. A car is 
a good example of how humankind has exceeded, by the help of technology, their 
biological limits, and in some cases with the fatal consequences.  
 A human being regulates his or her activity by psyche but there are no 
psychological processes, states or qualities outside the organism, outside the CNS 
(Lomov 1984). In driving the brain is without doubt the most important organ.  
 
 
Figure 2.  
 
 
However, there is not any simple correspondence between the brain and driving,  but the 
final outcomes of the driving are affected by many factors (Figure 3).  Thus, e.g., from 
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neuropsychological tests one cannot make direct conclusion on driving ability. From 
these factors affecting driving only a part can be localised directly in the brain whereas 
a part is in one’s net of relationships rather than in the CNS.  
Individual differences in the CNS have been intensively studied 
particularly in the Russian neurophysiological school since Pavlov introduced the 
concept of the types of nervous systems (TNS) or the types of higher nervous activity to 
science . According to Pavlov the configuration of the basic properties of the nervous 
processes constitutes the TNS. Three basic properties of the nervous system according 
to Pavlov are the strength of the nervous system, equilibrium of excitation and 
inhibition processes and mobility of nervous processes (see e.g. Gray 1964; Nebylitsin 
and Gray 1972). The strength of a nervous system may be defined as the endurance of 
the nervous system in the face of continuous (or frequently) repeated excitation. The 
mobility of the nervous processes seems suitable for denoting the property characterised 
by the speed of transformation of nervous processes (Teplov 1972). Basic properties of 
the CNS have been linked to such driving related factors as vigilance (Pushkin 1972), 
flexibility and endurance (Gurevich et al., 1975), tolerance of monotony (Stepanova and 
Rozdestvenskaja 1986) and capacity to act as professional drivers (Klyagin et al. 1977).  
In our test pattern, the test of vigilance clearly measures tolerance or endurance 
(strength) of the NS towards monotony, and the tests of information.  
 
4.3.1.2. Temperament and dynamics of psychological processes  
 
Temperament acts as an intermediary link between an organism and a personality. 
Temperament strongly depends on qualities of the CNS and it is coupled with the 
biological basis of a human being. Temperament can be seen as the psychological 
manifestation of a general type of a higher nervous system where the properties of the 
CNS form the neural structure of temperament (Strelau 1983).  
Temperament is the whole of the individual differences characterising dynamics 
and emotionality of a person’s activity and behaviour. The qualities of a temperament 
are quite stable elements compared to some other psychological characteristics. As a 
formal-dynamics level of psyche, in temperament there is not such ‘content’ elements as 
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attitudes, interests and motives which develop in communication and interaction with 
other people.  
Eysenck (1967) studied two continua (extrovert - introvert and stable - unstable), 
plotting his results in four quadrants which might represent the four temperaments. 
Eysenck's constructs have been fundamental concerns for many years and have been the 
basis for descriptive, as well as non-biological, theories of motivation and learning. 
Eysenck’s theory is most frequently used in temperament dimensions in traffic research, 
as well according to Cloninger’s psychobiological model of personality, temperament 
can be described by four genetically independent dimensions— novelty seeking , harm 
avoidance , reward dependence, and persistence (Cloninger et al. 1993).  
Individual differences in temperament dimensions cause differential sensitivities to 
specific classes of stimuli and environmental cues, leading to differential affective 
states. The characteristics of sensation seeking, extraversion, and impulsivity may be 
referred to as action-oriented temperament dimensions.  
Rusalov (1985) outlines temperament in the following way: 1) it is not related to the 
content of an activity but reflects the formal side of an activity, 2) it characterises the 
dynamics of the subject in his/her relations with the world, 3) it is universal, 4) it 
manifests itself in early childhood, 5) it is permanent, and 6) it correlates with the basic 
properties of the NS and with other biological subsystems like hormonal regulation. 
As dynamic and emotional aspect of personality, the driving tempo and rhythm, in 
other words driving style, depend substantially on temperament characteristics. 
Temperament is another basis of driving style besides a personality and in that way may 
in some cases have indirect effects on driving ability. However, there is not a direct 
connection between temperament and driving ability in the frame of “legal” driver 
evaluation.  
 
4.3.1.3. Personality and ability to realise, act and communicate  
 
The famous adage ‘man drives as he lives’ (Tillmann and Hobbs 1949), means that 
people express their personality behind the wheel. A worrier is a worrier at home and 
behind the wheel, a prudent person is cautious in traffic and at work. In the words of 
Evans (2002) ”a crash risk relates to factors at the very core of human personality”. 
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Personality factors have an impact on road accidents through their effects on actual 
driving-related performance.  
So, what is human personality? Use of the term personality is so broad that a 
coherent, simple and unambiguous definition for it cannot be made. A personality is 
kind of an umbrella term under which there is room for a large number of a most 
different views and research methods (Pervin 1989). Pervin (2003) defines a personality 
as the complex organisation of cognitions, affects, and behaviours that gives direction 
and pattern (coherence) to a person’s life. Like the body, personality consists of both 
structures and processes and reflects both nature (genes) and nurture (experience). In 
addition, personality includes the effects of the past, including memories of the past, as 
well as constructions of the present and future. Such a system cannot be but flexible and 
dynamic. A personality is not a bunch of inflexible and unchangeable traits, like trait 
theories, the dominating frame of reference of traffic psychology, claims.  
Criticizing Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory, Rubinshtein argues that 
psychological characteristics of the individual are not completely derived from the 
social environment (Bedny and Karwowski 2006). The schema from social to 
individual, from external to internal, does not take into consideration enough a human 
being as an active subject of his/her activity (Bruslinsky A.V, 1991-92) . According to 
Rubinshtein (1957, 2003), the external world never directly determined internal, mental 
activity but through the mediation of internal conditions. And the personality can be 
understood as a system of those internal conditions, through which all external 
influences are mediated. The personality is the whole of the inner conditions by which 
all the outer influences are refracted (ibid). These internal conditions include personal 
experience, hereditary predisposition, properties of CNS, characteristics of 
temperament, abilities, and prevailing state of the subject. Therefore, Bedny and 
Karwowski (2006) note, that the origin of consciousness cannot be reduced to 
internalization of the social. Further they write about internalization that it is not the 
transformation of the external into internal, but rather  the changing interralationship 
between the internal and external in human activity (ibid).  
According to Rubinshtein (2003) the aspect of a subject  which realises and in 
which is realised the unity of  consciousness and activity, is a personality. And, the 
human being’s basic way of existing is to do so be a conscious and active being, a 
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subject of consciousness and activity (Rubinshtein 2003). Abul’hanova-Slavskaja 
(1989) defines a personality as a triadic unity: what a man wants, what a man is able to 
do and what a man is. What a person wants appears  in his or her orientation, needs, 
attitudes, and ideals; What a person is able to do is manifested in his or her abilities and 
talents; What a  person is turns out in his or her inclinations crystallised in character. It 
is important to understand that a personality is not a moment or a product of an activity 
as mechanistic activity theorists claim, but quite the contrary, a personality is a basis of 
an activity and a social interaction. When activities of life are separated into a social 
interaction, a goal-directed activity, and experience then we can define a personality as 
a subject of a consciousness, activity, and communication and a way of experience 
(Heikkilä, 1994, 1995). According to Rubinshtein (1959) a realisation of all 
psychological processes depends on a personality and there is not a single psychological 
phenomenon which could be understood separate from personality.  
A human being as a personality constantly exceeds his or her current limits. A 
personality is not any kind of final photogenic frozen entity which one can measure and 
accurately observe but a personality is always something more than the sum of its parts. 
A personality is always forming and developing. A personality can be seen as the sum 
of a man’s all central relationships: a relation to himself, to other people, to goal-
directed activity (play, education and work) and relation to a society and to its rules and 
norms.  
When a formal-dynamic aspect of the psyche crystallises into temperament a 
personality is mainly a concept of content. Biology indirectly affects personality being 
the natural basis of temperament and abilities but personality comprises values, 
interests, motives, attitudes and all social relations of a human being. And according to 
Elander et al. (1993) attitude and aptitude of the driver are the criteria used for 
understanding driving problems. Further, in driving a personality becomes apparent in 
driving style which comprises selection of speed, driving tempo and willingness to 
violate traffic regulations (Rajalin and Keskinen 2002).  
When evaluating driving ability one has to take into consideration that personality 
disorders always mean in some relation inflexibility in behaviour, and together with 
other mental or physical restrictions, they may seriously affect driving. Certain 
personality characteristics such as low tension tolerance, immaturity, and paranoid 
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conditions are risk factors for traffic crashes. It is noteworthy that a diagnosis of 
antisocial personality disorder includes reckless driving (DSM III).  
A personality is a continuously changing system with enormous developmental 
capacity, and therefore a personality is the main source of  competence. Personality 
qualities such as cognitive flexibility, planning capacities,  adaptability to inner and 
outer changes are important for maintaining driving ability when driver’s own 
prerequisites are reduced. These qualities are crucial for a competence evaluation .  
Our findings and practice clearly show that  a flexible person with good self-
knowledge tolerates much more driving related restrictions than a rigid person with 
limited self-knowledge. Most of the young risky male drivers mature into safe ordinary 
middle-aged drivers on the basis of the developing capacity of their personality. 
Personality becomes particularly central in borderline cases when there is one or 
more problematic factors affecting driving but which alone do not cause inability to 
drive. If  the dominating personality trait is, e.g., impulsiveness or rigidity, such a 
person for safety reasons tolerates less driving-related cognitive or other deficiencies 
compared with a balanced or flexible person. The personality of the driver is decisive: 
all the test results and the clinical findings have to be judged in relation to the 
personality of the driver.  
 
4.3.1.4.  An individuality and style of life and activity  
 
At the core of personality lies an individuality. By an individuality one refers to a very 
core of personality considered as an unique creature. Individuality means individual 
variation in the structure common to all persons. Individuality is manifested  in 
individual style of life and activity (Merlin 1986). Basically a driving style is always 
unique and individual. An individual style of activity depends not only on individual 
differences in objective requirements but of an activity as well. One can drive a car 
individually but only within certain limits of the common rules. Individual style of 
activity is not only a possibility but all activity always is individual and unique because 
every person has his or her unique genotype and history through which all outer 
influences are reflected (Rubinshtein 2003). Individual driving style develops on the 
basis of temperament and personality and therefore it represents both dynamic and 
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qualitative aspects of driving. An individual style of activity is a descriptive level of 
human reality. Of course this concerns driving style too. According to Elander, West 
and French (1993) hasty decision making, antisocial and inappropriate motives and 
norms of behaviour contribute to a dangerous driving style.  
 
4.3.2. Inducing elements of activity  and their relations to the tasks and  
           goals 
 
A need provides the initial stimulus for an activity, which first stimulates a behaviour 
aimed at finding an object capable of satisfying the need that has arisen. A need is an 
inner state of a person, whereas an object which can satisfy a need is outside of the 
person. Besides biological, material, mental and social needs there are so called quasi-
needs too. They are idols and ideas which particularly influence young drivers' driving 
behaviour.  
Driving symbolises independence and autonomy in our society (Reimer et al. 2005). 
Driving satisfies, in addition to transportation, the need to maintain autonomy and the 
possibility to drive may markedly support the self-esteem of a person.  
Needs that induce human activity directed to attain certain goals are called motives 
(Petrovsky 1986). In the ability to direct the search lies the regulative function of 
motives (Kotik 1978). Thus, needs are the impetus for activity whereas motives are its 
directive force.  
In an analysis of motives one has to exceed the individual level because different 
groups of people have different motives. The motives of the young drivers certainly 
differ from those of the elderly drivers (Summala 1987).  
When a suitable object for a need is found, it transforms into the goal of an activity 
and an objectless activity turns  into a concrete goal-directed activity to reach an already 
conscious goal  
 (Kotik 1978). In activity theory a goal is a conscious mental representation of humans’ 
own activity in conjunction with a motive (Bedny and Karwowski 2006). 
Besides its real existence, the chosen object now begins to live in the mind of the 
person as a target-image, that is to say, a motive. When a goal of an activity is defined 
the plan to reach the goal is actualised. A target-image directs a selection and 
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integration of information during the execution of an activity. From outside one can set 
requirements for a subject but a goal of activity of a subject forms himself. A goal is an 
ideal vision of the result of an activity and there simply does not exist a non-goal-
directed or unmotivated human activity. The motive defines the kind of activity in 
question. Drivers driving one after the other on the same road are executing quite 
different activities. Perhaps one is on a shopping trip, another is calming down by 
driving after contention, and third escaping his fictional persecutors as was the case in 
our study (V).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.  Genesis and development  of activity  according to Kotik (1978). 
 
The vector motive-goal points out the direction of an activity and the force 
mobilised by the subject toward its realisation (Lomov 1984). This vector defines 
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dynamics of the psychological process and what a person sees, remembers, thinks, etc. 
The vector motive-goal is the main regulator mechanism of a driving activity.  
Human lives can be conceptualized as an ongoing attempt to solve tasks or 
problems. The task is a specific kind of activity, which comprises different actions and 
operations and present by itself as a complicated system. Accordingly, the task can be 
considered as the basic object of study. A task is unity of the goal and conditions of its 
achievement (Psihologitseskij Slovar 1983). Tasks may also be definend as a logically 
organized system of mental and behavioural actions, directed toward an ultimate task-
goal. In contrast to cognitive psychology in activity theory the task is a situation which 
requires achievment of a goal in specific conditions. Hence the task in activity theory 
includes motivational components (Rubinshtein 1973; Leont’ev 1977; Bedny and 
Karwowski 2006).  
  A goal is a conscious mental representation of humans’ own activity in 
conjunction with a motive. Goals are cognitive, informational components of activity, 
that may be contrasted with motives, or motivation in general. Motives are energetic 
components of an activity. The more intense the motive, the greater the effort to reach 
the conscious goal. Motive-goals create a vector that lends goal-directed activity its 
directedness.  
According to Shadrikov  (1982) a goal appears in two aspects: an ideal vision of the 
results of an activity, and as a target level. The goal is considered as a conscious mental 
representation of the future results of one’ s own actions that are connected with a 
motive. Simplistically put, motives, methods of performance and goal directed 
behaviour as a whole can be formulated consciously or unconsciously, but the goal of 
an activity is always conscious (Bedny, Seglin and Meister 2000). To be precise, at least 
some aspect of a goal always has to be conscious.  
One has  to distinguish final and intermediate goals from each other. The goal of 
action should be distinguished from the goal of a task or an activity in general 
(Bruslinskij 1987). By performing a logically organised sequence of actions, subjects 
achieve intermediate goals of actions and then goals of task or activity in general 
(Bedny and Karwowski 2004).  
Satisfaction or nonsatisfaction of diverse needs is conveyed by affects and emotions 
that in turn may induce activity  (Bedny and Karwowski 2006). Emotions are associated 
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with needs and interests expresses to us whether they are satisfied or not. Our emotions 
hold in memory works as motives and regulators of driving. Depending on a mark of an 
emotion it either inhibits or provides motives for participating in an activity.   
In driving emotional memory plays an important role. Emotional experiences give 
an activity its basic accent. In traffic there are aggressive, balanced, depressed, cheerful 
drivers whose mode of an activity is regulated by their basic emotional accent. 
Transplacement of any unpleasant memories into current driving situation from the 
person's driving history, is possible.  
 
 
4.3.3.  Reflection of internal and external conditions of driving 
 
Reflection is a particular kind of interaction among phenomenon in which the reflected 
object preserves its topological structure within a systematic reflective medium 
(Platanov 1982). Psychological reflection is the individual’s active and  complex 
process of adaptation and capturing internal and external reality.  
Correct recognition of internal (subjective) and external (objective) conditions of 
driving affect organisation, planning and regulation of driving activity. The dynamic 
reflection of inner and outer conditions of activity contains logico-conceptual, 
imaginative, conscious and unconscious components which enable individuals to 
develop mental models of external events (Bedny and Meister 1999; Stanton et al. 
2001).  
4.3.3.1.  Reflection of internal subjective conditions of driving  
 
The frontal lobes, in particular the frontal poles, are involved in uniquely human capacities, 
including self-awareness and mental time travel (Stuss and Levine 2002). Self-awareness 
of deficits is considered a component of executive functioning (Burgess et al. 1998) and it 
is thought to play an essential role in self-judgement regarding fitness to drive (Coleman et 
al. 2002). Denial of one’s symptoms and serious deficits is always a significant risk factor 
for safe driving.  
Cognitive and psychomotor flexibility is of the most importance for safe driving, and 
many diseases and disorders especially affect flexibility of mental processes. For 
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explaining the degree of flexibility of higher mental functions, complex multitask tests 
have to be used instead of the narrow ‘one-channel’ and one-factor tests. In general, 
measures of frontal and executive functions, which are linked to the skills at higher task 
levels of driving, are essential in evaluations of driving ability and measurement of an 
information-processing capacity is the central issue in evaluation of neurological 
patients’ driving ability. Our patient groups had considerable difficulties in perceptual 
flexibility and vigilance tests, and they were unable to perceive themselves or their 
defects in these functions (III-V).  
 
4.3.3.2. Reflection of external objective conditions of driving 
 
Drivers do not merely react to stimuli, but rather a driver must actively extract the 
required information from the traffic environment and interprets it according to the 
requirements of the goal.  
The information processing of a driver may be controlled or automated. Controlled 
processing requires significant conscious effort whereas automatic processing requires 
less mental effort and concentration of attention. Therefore, whenever possible, in the 
name of the saving of psychological energy, drivers prefer to automatic processing.  
Safe driving performance requires unimpaired cognitive functions, including 
perception, decision-making, information processing (reasoning, memory), selective, 
sustained, and divided attention and vigilance ( Elander et al. 1993; French  et al. 1993; 
Ranney 1994; Summala 1996, Daigneault et al. 2002). Selective attention refers to the 
ability to screen out irrelevant stimuli whereas sustained attention or vigilance may be 
defined as the ability to focus attention on a task over unbroken periods of time (Perry 
and Hodges 1999; Wilkins et al. 1987). Arousal is the state needed to remain vigilant.  
Information processing while driving has some specialities. First, in driving, 
information is obtained partly from the control devices, partly from the external 
environment, and perception and information processing goes side by side as a decision 
making and also executive action. Second, thinking while driving always has some 
temporal limits within the contexts where a driver has to act. Third, the price of 
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decisions may be very high. The above described form of practical thinking is called 
operative thinking in the activity theory (Pushkin 1966).  
Visuospatial abilities are crucial for safe driving, and in this respect division of 
labour between hemispheres plays an important role in driving as well. In the stroke 
study both the psychologist and the neurologist evaluated the patients with the non-
dominant hemisphere lesion as being unable to drive a car more often compared to the 
patients with the dominant hemisphere lesion. The result is logical when the 
specialisation between cerebral hemispheres and the demands of driving is taken into 
consideration. It might not be merely by chance that five out of the sample of six 
actively driving stroke patients had a lesion in the dominant hemisphere, while only one 
had a lesion in the non-dominant hemisphere.  
It is a very general finding that perceptual and psychomotor processes take 
significantly more time after TBI. Because driving has many elements of time pressure, 
slowed information processing can be a problem, particularly when very extreme 
(Brouwer et al. 2002). This was also the case in our stroke patients. In our study the 
laboratory tests efficiently distinguished the stroke patients from the controls especially 
in terms of sensorimotor speed (table 2, study III).  
Brain injury and the stroke patients can often be characterised as one-channel 
persons with significant limitations of simultaneous information processing and they are 
also often slow in sequential processing. The same kind of problems in information-
processing were met with in the mentally-deficient persons in our practise.  
In our patient groups measures of reduced speed of mental processing were found to 
be the most discriminating variables for driving. In particular, the patients had 
limitations in speed and flexibility of visual processing, which is one of the basic 
functions needed in driving.  
 
 
4.3.4.  Planning in driving  
 
With actualisation of the goal, the plan is immediately formed in the person’s  
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consciousness (Miller, Galanter and Pribram 1960), and the plan consists of a series of 
successive actions each of them aimed at performing a single step in reaching an 
intermediary result on the way to the final goal of activity (Kotik 1978).  
Departing from the goal, which reflects the future result, in the plan the strategy and 
the tactic of  achieving the goal is reflected (Lomov 1984). The plan is made on the 
basis of analysis of subjective and objective conditions of driving and it is formed in a 
driver’s mind during the period of anticipation. The plan organises actions in time and 
place.  
Without a plan it is impossible to connect different actions to the united system and 
to the activity. And an activity is organised in different ways depending on the plan. 
Roughly simplified one may suppose that there are three levels of the plans:  
- flexible plan: possible changes in internal and external conditions of driving activity 
is anticipated. 
-  rigid plan: unpredictable situations and events disorient activity 
-  no plan: a driver responds and acts in traffic without a systematic plan   
Planning is connected with personality factors, intelligence, experience, and executive 
control functions. The term executive control functions has been applied to a set of 
higher-order cognitive processes that control, integrate, organise and maintain other 
cognitive abilities (Pohjasvaara et al. 2002). Specifically, the term has been used to 
describe a group of cognitive actions like dealing with novelty, planning and  
implementing strategies for performance, monitoring and controlling performance, using 
feedback to adjust future responding and correct errors, strategic control of memory 
search plans, allocation of attention and inhibiting task-irrelevant information, mental  
flexibility, set maintenance and set shifting (Rabbit 1997). Planning deficits are 
associated with lesions to the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Burgess et al. 2000). 
Drivers having accidents made more errors that reflect mental rigidity 
(perseverative errors, flexibility problems, etc.) and had poorer ability to plan and solve 
problems (Daigneault et al. 2002). Task complexity can affect which regions of the 
frontal lobes are involved. As a general rule for some processes, the more complex the 
function, the more frontal brain regions involved (Stuss and Levine 2002). Thus 
executive functions are of most importance in non-routine, in non-automated tasks, such 
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as driving a car on non-familiar roads. There are good reasons  to suppose that patients 
with damages to frontal areas often have problems in driving.  
 
4.3.5.  Decision making in driving  
 
The process of decision making consists of perceiving of problem situation, forming 
different hypotheses, evaluation of hypotheses, and selecting the hypothesis.   
Drivers make decisions consciously and unconsciously during different stages of 
the driving event. It can be an automated or voluntary process. Operations are normally 
selected autoamatically by a driver whereas actions are selected consciously. 
Strategy of driving reflects the content of the highest level of hierarchy which also 
includes elements beyond proper driving (e.g., Keskinen 1996), whereas tactics of 
driving are linked to the goals of driving. At the strategic level, a driver chooses the 
transport used, makes a decision on the trip and times a drive (Summala 1996). Tactics 
of driving cover, e.g., mapping out of the route of the trip.  
Tendency to commit driving violations, fast driving, and lack of thoroughness in 
decision making have been reliably shown to be associated with increased accident risk 
(West, Elander and French 1991), and French et al. (1993) found that the connection 
between these factors does not depend on age, sex or experience.  
It is possible to classify decisions in terms of the informational processes involved and 
nature of the situation in which decisions are made. For example, Fogel (see Bedny and 
Meister 1997) classified decisions as deductive (e.g. following learned operating 
procedures with little uncertainty), abductive (determing causal factors and how to proceed 
in a situation involving at least some uncertainty), inductive (requiring the integration of 
multiple parameters and utilization og a mental model of a system), and prognostic 
(decisions requiring the forecasting of transformations in the initial situation).  
Decision making is a very individual act where individual differences are clearly 
manifested and  decision making style depends on  personality qualities. If decision 
making is divided into forming of hypotheses (HF) and control measures (CM) then we 
get the following ways of decision making which reflect a driver’s individual 
differences (Kulytkin and Suhobskaja 1971):  
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 HF  >>  CM       impulsive decisions  
 HF  >    CM risk decisions 
 HF  =    CM balanced decisions 
 HF  <    CM cautious decisions  
 HF  <<  CM       inert decisions 
 
From a safety standpoint, the group of impulsive drivers are the most problematic 
whereas from the point of traffic fluency the group of the inert drivers easily form 
‘blocks of traffic’ who may unintentionally cause rear-ender accidents by their 
overcautious driving style.  
According to our studies, a hasty and incorrect style in which an activity was done 
in the laboratory seems to mean an increasing number of errors in traffic. Well-timed 
decisions are crucial for safe and fluent driving.  
Our findings indicate that decision making errors in the choice reaction test are 
positively connected to faults of the on-road test. Decision making errors are shown in 
hurrying and this may cause faults on the road.   
 
4.3.6.  Actions and operations as units of an activity 
 
The study of activity structure at the individual-psychological stage of analysis 
presupposes the study of mental and practical actions of the individuals, their logical 
organization, and the study of the self-regulation mechamism (Bedny and Karwowski 
2006). 
Activity is always an activity of some concrete person or persons, i.e. a collective 
subject. There is no subjecteless activity. And only a real subject may have mental and 
physiological resources needed in planning and execution of human activity. An 
abstract stucture has not such resources and qualities.  
Rubinshtein decomposes activity into major components, namely, motive, goal, 
action, and operation. Similar components were also described by Leont’ev (1947) 
(activity-action-operation and correspondingly motive-goal-conditions). Later Leont’ev 
(1977, 1978) and Zinchenko (1961) drew the conclusion that external and internal 
activities are to some extent isomorphic. This view is, however, criticized by many 
activity theorists (see Bedny and Karwowski 2006).  
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Psychologically the most essential components of a goal-directed activity besides 
that of the  subject of  activity are an action (in contrast to a reactions and movements) 
and operations in their interrelationship with the goal, motive, and conditions of activity 
of the subject ( Bruslinskij 1987; Gameso and Domashenko 1986; Kotik 1978; Leontjev 
1978; Lomov 1977). Actions are fundamental elements through which one can recreate 
holistic activity. Each action has separate conscious goals that must be reached to attain 
the overall goal of the task (Bedny, Seglin and Meister 2000). Since action is organised 
as a self-regulated system, the starting point of any action is the moment when the goal 
for the action is formulated or accepted, and the action is completed when the individual 
achieves the conscious goal of the action and evaluates the result of the action in terms 
of the established goal (Bedny, Seglin and Meister 2000; Bedny and Karwowski 2004). 
An activity is always directed toward the final goal and actions are carried out 
according to the same motives as an activity, but they are directed toward intermediate 
goals whereas operations are subordinate to the conditions of an activity. 
An action differs from a reaction in that it has a different kind of relation to the 
object. For a reaction, an object is only a stimulus, i.e., the external reason or an impulse 
causing it. In contrast to a reaction, an action is an act of activity directed not to a 
stimulus, but at the object and goal.  
An action is different not only from reactions but also from activity, primarily 
because of its different relationship to the subject. An action becomes a deed to the 
extent that it begins to be regulated by more or less cognisable relations toward the 
acting subject and toward other people as subjects and, in particular, as self-awareness 
evolves. The same activity can be carried out with different actions, and the same action 
can be a component of different activities (Bruslinskij 1987).  
Actions have both an intentional aspect, i.e., what one  has to reach, and an 
operational one, i.e., by which means the result is achieved. An operational aspect of an 
action is related to the lowest level of a hierarchy of activity and operations depend on 
conditions and circumstances but not on goals.  
      The system of an activity as a whole is dynamic and it continually evolves. Activity 
constantly changes and transforms itself in the process of  carrying out a concrete goal-
directed activity: an action becomes an operation when its goal is changed, and action is 
able to become an activity when a motive is changed (Leontjev 1978).  
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According to Bedny and Karwowski (2006) an action can be described in terms of a 
recursive loop structure. Since action is organized as a self-regulated system, the 
starting point of any action is the moment when the goal of the action is formulated or 
accepted (figure 4).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Simplified model of action as a one-loop system.  
 
 
Actions are the result of historical development. From this point of view, actions are 
prior to the subject who first has to learn and internalizase the action and only then 
he/she is able to carry it out. Each object, e.g. a car or its control devices have spesific to 
them actions, and traffic is governed by laws and social norms and values. Actions are 
as if embedded in a such man-machine system as driving a car. Moreover, tools and 
instruments used in executing actions have their own developmental history too. 
Driving a car has more than a centenarian history.  
An action may be formulated in terms of the object of action, the tools of an action, 
the goal of action and the subject of an action. Actions are the result of social-historical 
development. Each object has specific associated actions, governed by social norms and 
values. Actions are facilitated by tools that similarly possess a history and cultural 
context (Bedny and Karwowski 2004).  Actions shall be one of the main subjects of the 
driver’s evaluation. In the theory of activity different methods of classification of 
mental and practical actions are used (Dushkov et al.1986; Bedny 1987; Bedny et al. 
2000). The simplest way to classify actions is to divide them into external and internal 
ones. Regarding mental actions, they may be classified according to psychological 
processes to sensory, perceptual, information processing and mnestic actions. Every 
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action has a practical, i.e., motor component. When we are observing, our eyes are 
moving, when thinking, organs of articulation always move to some extent. Galperin 
(1979) divided actions into the following categories: orientation, executive and 
control/corrective. When the detailed information concerning the functioning of  actions 
is needed, a classification depending upon the nature of the object of actions can be 
useful (Lomov 1986; Bedny and Karwowski 2004): object-practical actions, object-
mental actions, sign-practical actions performed with real signs and  sign-mental actions 
that are performed mentally by manipulating symbols (Figure 5.).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Classifications of actions according to Lomov (1986) and Bedny & Karwowski (2006). 
 
 
Actions performed by the subject of activity through their skeletal-muscular system that 
changes the state of objects in the external world, or as in the case of driving a car, 
change the parameters of the control devices, are called object-practical-actions. Object-
mental actions are performed mentally by the subject of activity with images of objects.  
In driving object-mental actions are related to planning and  strategy as well self-
regulation with different kinds of inner models.   
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Sign-practical actions are performed by the subject of activity with real signs receiving 
them from different devices and sources. In driving this means receiving information 
from the traffic environment (traffic signs and instructions, winker and brake lights of 
other’s cars, etc.) and from the instrument panel (speedometer, tachometer, etc.). Sign-
mental actions are mentally carried out by the subject of activity by manipulating and 
processing symbolic information received from different devices. The information 
concerning the functioning of these mental actions or cognitive blocks of driving 
activity is obtained from off-road  and on-roads tasks.  
Actions associated with different driving subtasks are, e.g., decision making 
concerning the moment of overtaking, changing a line, crossing a junction, etc., timing 
of different manoeuvring (turning, shifting, braking, etc.), observing instruments and 
traffic signs, selective observation in general, maintaining vigilance, identification of 
significant objects and observing using rear-view mirrors.  
As Lomov (1984) pointed out, there are actions executed with concrete objects and 
there are ideal actions, which are accosiated with sign systems. However, any activity 
includes both “material” and “ideal” actions. All physical activity has its “inner side” 
(Lomov 1984). 
Actions can be also divided into reactive and proactive. Reactive actions depend on 
features of the objective situations; proactive actions, which are determined largely by 
personality characteristics, usually take place in nonsturctured, complex, and 
indeterminate situations (Bedny and Meister 1997). For safety reason, drivers have to be 
able to carry out proactive actions too. For their evaluation behind-the-wheel test is 
needed.  
Activity and actions can also be evaluated by their meaning and sense where 
meanings are objective and sense is subjective depending on the motive behind the 
action (Leontjev 1978). Motives can be ‘only known’ or ‘ really effective’ ones  
(Leontjev 1981). Apparent similar actions may have different senses depending on what 
each  are trying to achieve by these actions.  
Operations are a technical part of actions and they do not have an independent goal 
but are subordinated to the goal of the current action (Kotik 1987). The driving 
operations are already partly substituted by technology or they are made easier to carry 
out (automatic transmission, speed regulator, servo systems, etc.) and in the long run  
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information technology shall take care of a continually increasing part of control 
and also execution operations while the higher-level mental actions will stay under a 
driver’s control.  
According to Leont’ev (1977), actions become automated and unconscious 
operations during training and repetition. Both mental and motor operations are initially 
conscious but by repetition they shall first be abbreviated and then they become step by 
step unconscious. Leontjev (1978) illustrates the process of the transformation of 
actions into operations using driving a car as the example: “Initially every operation, 
such as shifting gears, is formed as an action subordinated specifically to this goal and 
has its own conscious “orientation basis” (Leontjev refers here to Galperin, vmh). 
Subsequently this action is included in another action , for example, changing the speed 
of the car. Now shifting gears becomes one of the methods for attaining the goal, the 
operation that effects the change is speed, and shifting gears now ceases to be 
accomplished as a specific goal-oriented process: Its goal is not isolated. For the 
consciousness of the driver, shifting gears in normal circumstances is as if it did not 
exist. He does something else: He moves the car from a place, climbs steep grades, 
driver the car fast, stops at a given place, etc. Actually this operation of shifting gears 
may, as is known, be removed entirely from the activity of the driver and be carried out 
automatically. Generally, the fate of the operation sooner or later becomes the function 
of the machine”.  
Total mileage is very important for the degree of automatisation of driving tasks. To 
learn safe driving, an individual must develop standardised actions, and on the other 
hand, an individually flexible driving style too. 
The closed driving test is a good method for an examination of operations and to 
examine how well the person has become adjusted to his or her deficiencies and aid 
devices. An action-operation analysis shows how stressful driving a car is for drivers: 
the greater part of the driving tasks that are at the level of conscious actions, the more 
loading driving is. However, the final decisions must be made on the level of actions 
because they have a real connection to the motives and goals of driving.    
 
 
 
 89  
4.3.7.  Self-regulation of driving  
 
Driving activity is not a stable, unchangeable structure but it constantly changes and 
transforms itself in the process of carrying out goal-oriented actions. Therefore a driver 
has to regulate his or her driving performance. Regulation of driving is the process of 
consolidation of objective requirements and automated processes. The regulator of 
driving is a driver, a subject of an activity, and driving, despite the numerous technical 
innovations, is still based on self-regulations. Driving safety is actually equivalent to the 
state of self-regulation. Consequently, psyche as the highest system of regulation, is the 
basic element of driving ability.  
In driving the role of self-regulation can hardly be overestimated. In accidents most 
often the underlying cause is the failure of self-regulation, that is to say, a human factor. 
Without self-regulation there is no flexibility or adaptability in human activity, and the 
more degrees of freedom there are, the more important the role of self-regulation is for 
success and the result of an activity.  
For the subject, the relation to the object is just that, a relation, and hence it 
specifically regulates all activity. The subject regulates his or her activity by psyche, 
especially by consciousness, and driving is not an exception. Psyche works as a 
regulator especially as a process, because psyche is forming, reforming and developing 
all the time through interaction with people and the environment. According to 
Bruslinkij (1989) the main form of existence of psyche is a process. And psyche as a 
process constantly regulates activity, i.e., regulation has to be understood as non-
disjunctive parallel processing (Bruslinskij 1994).  
All external activities also have intrinsically psychological components by the help 
of which a subject of an activity regulates external activity (Rubinshtein 1973). 
Generally, this immanence of psychological elements in every motor action, enables 
regulation of a practical activity such as driving, too. So, juxtaposition of external and 
internal aspects of an activity is fruitless and erroneous because psyche as a regulator of 
an activity is included in all external activity (Rubinshtein 2003). Studying an executive 
part of an activity separately from its psychological basis (an action as an image), 
inevitably leads to a mechanical view of human activity.  
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The fact that driving is a practical form of human activity but not theoretical, does 
not mean that its regulation should somehow be easier to carry out than the theoretical 
form of the activity, rather the contrary, because in driving there is limited time 
resources for decision making and regulation. Driving is in most cases to some extent 
force-paced: one has to obey traffic signs and rules, in traffic flow one has to drive at a 
certain speed for the sake of traffic fluency, etc. Social pressure on the road is 
substantial and only few can stand up to it. If in intellectual activity one can test 
hypotheses and decisions in principle unendingly, a driver most often performs here and 
now situations where everything has to work on the first attempt while immaterial and 
material costs of a wrong decision may be very high. This in turn increases emotionality 
in regulation of driving.     
As a rule there is time pressure towards operations when driving in traffic flow 
whereas at least some subtask-related actions, although they are mentally more 
complicated than operation, are in principle free of time pressure (e.g., decision to 
overtake, functioning at the ordinary crossroads). When activity is highly automated, the 
planning and the evaluation of results are extremely abridged. Then the process of 
regulation occurs unconsciously at the level of operations (Mikkonen and Keskinen 
1980; Hacker 1981). However, these operations can be raised to a conscious level, for 
example in the case of functional disability or diseases.  
Psychological self-regulative systems provide the integration of cognitive, 
executive, evaluative and emotional-motivational components of activity. During an 
individual’s self-regulative process, the programme of self-regulation, criteria of self-
regulation and even the goal of self-regulation may be changed. Self-regulation is a 
process that supplies co-ordination among the various psychological functions in 
accordance with a specific goal (Bedny, Seglin and Meister 2000).  
Regulation of driving is affected by conditions of a subject (fatigue, emotions, 
intoxication, etc.), attitudes, and abilities. On the other hand regulation in itself is the 
process of producing such specific conditions as set (Uznadze 1966) and situative 
awareness (Endsley 1995, Stanton 2001).  
The set creates a predisposition to processing information in a particular way or a 
predisposition to performing particular actions (Uzndze 1986). The set is an internal 
state of a person which unconsciously determines the purposefulness of human 
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behaviour. The transformation of the conscious goal into an unconscious set when 
attention shifts to new tasks allows the subject to return quickly to the formely 
interrupted task. Goals are the only components of self-regulation that have to be 
conscious during self-regulation (Bedny and Karwowski 2006). 
Levels of self-regulations are relationship of personality and the world, task-related 
regulations and regulations of his or her own condition. Self-regulation includes 
conscious and unconscious levels where the former level is linked to actions and the 
latter to operations.  
 
Relationship of personality and the world are manifested in values and attitudes. 
Strategic-level decisions are partly value-based, e.g., choice of a car. Attitudes toward 
other people and societal norms are directly connected to driving safety. Task-related 
regulation can be divided into senso-perceptive, imaginary, and verbal-logistic levels 
(Lomov 1984). In driving the two previous are central. Partly regulation of driving is 
carried out automatically because a part of motives may be unconscious and operations 
are automated.  
In driving the role of the internal models are crucial. In regulation we consciously 
or unconsciously compare here and now situations and results of our performance to 
inner models (Keskinen et al. 1992), i.e., conceptual models and operative schemes 
(Pushkin 1965). These inner models can be tested and observed to some degree in the 
course of the behind-the-wheel driving test.  
Task-related regulation begins by forming an image of the task. A driver compares 
this image  with previous solutions made by him/her in similar situations. In this process 
of comparison the view of degree of difficulty of the task is formulated and at the same 
time mobilisation of energy takes place. The more important a task the more a driver 
mobilises energy to its solution. The objective significance and personal sense of the 
task is directed to the use of man’s psychological and physiological capacity (figure 6).   
When driving we consciously or unconsciously compare here and now situations 
and results of our performance to inner models, i.e., conceptual and operative models. 
Inner models are ideal models of how an activity has to be realised. A conceptual model 
is a cognitive map including all the traffic-related information and experience the driver 
has obtained. Operative schemes comprise programmes of series of operations and 
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knowledge of control devices (Pushkin 1965). And, in all human systems there  is a 
feedback loop from the results of performance to the subject of activity.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.  Regulation of activity (Kotik 1978). 
 
Driving is in some degree a self-paced performance but this aspect seems to be 
overestimated at least to some extent in the case of driving in traffic flow. In traffic all 
the drivers have to adjust to the given driving rhythm and tempo. This does not directly 
depend on traffic regulation but on social pressure. In traffic, besides traffic regulations 
there is group dynamics within which a diver has to act. And one has to underline that 
these invisible boundaries exist objectively and nobody can avoid them.  
 
4.4.  Abilities in activity  
 
In the dissertation the main question focuses on abilities. Therefore it is appropriate to 
provide some theoretical points of view concerning abilities.  
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An ability is an individual characteristic. The essence of the term ability is that the 
person can perform the task now, no further training is needed (Dictionary of 
psychology 1985). Second, the abilities are individual differences linked to success in 
some activities and they are not similar to skills or knowledge but on these depend how 
easily or difficulty they are adopted (Teplov 1985). Third, the abilities are not innate as 
their anatomical and physiological prerequisites. Fourth, the abilities are connected to 
development and the development of a human being is development of his or her 
abilities, too. Abilities not only manifest themselves in activities but they also develop 
in activities. Since abilities are connected with development then they do not exist 
outside development (Rubinshtein 1989; Bruslinsky 1982). There are not abilities 
outside the corresponding activities. Thus, there are no common innate  driving abilities.  
Consequently, in principle it is even impossible to study the driving ability of a 
person who does not yet have driving experience. As far as not yet licensed persons 
with handicaps or chronic illnesses are concerned the question is about general 
emotional, cognitive, sensorimotor and personality qualifications for safe driving but 
not about actual driving ability. There is no ability to act outside the corresponding form 
of activity. For them the decision had to made whether to go to the driving school or 
not. Abilities become rusty without practise and in the case of a long interruption in 
driving a re-educational course is highly recommend.  
When trying to decide where driving ability is localised a concept of the functional 
system is useful (Anohin 1975). The functional system is understood as a dynamic 
organisation which selectively associates both central and peripheral sections for a good 
result. Even a relatively simple movement forms a complicated functional system 
including sensory and kinestetic impulses. In driving we are dealing with a complex 
biosocial activity which is impossible to be localised to some limited section of CNS or 
an organism. Therefore one cannot measure driving ability in the same way that 
muscular strength is measured by isometric devices, or in the way that volume of 
working memory is measured by the digit span test. Because abilities are connected 
with a development and activity, a process-centred approach is needed where the 
process is emphasised besides the result. In a process-centred evaluation there should be 
a  focus on describing a style of an activity instead of the cross-section diagnosis.  
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5   EVALUATION OF DRIVING ABILITY 
 
The requirements regarding driving ability are stipulated in the Road traffic act 
(Tieliikennelaki  2006). By law,  refusal of driving requires proof that an examinee has 
a significant driving-related restriction(s). However, WHO’s ICF encourages looking at 
driving with a wider perspective. It seems that the future of driver evaluations is drawn 
in ICF. Therefore driving and driving ability are considered here in a wider perspective 
than the valid Finnish traffic law provides.  
Evaluation of the driving ability of disabled persons is a demanding task that carries 
a great deal of responsibility. Both false positive and false negative decisions have 
undesirable consequences. False positive decisions may lead to unsafe driving, even to 
accidents, which cause enormous immaterial and material expenses for a driver 
him/herself and for the third parties. On the other hand false negative decisions mean 
unjustifiable restriction of persons’ independence.  
 
5.1.  General views and recommendations on driver evaluations 
 
The crux of the problem lays in the definition of driving a car as a social form of human 
activity in a man-machine or man-technology environment. The complexity of the 
phenomenon of  the ability to drive a car underlines the importance of the interplay of 
social, psychological, environmental, medical, and technical factors.  
Driving as a social performance with universal traffic regulations sets some psycho-
physiological requirements common to all the drivers regardless of the driver’s age, sex, 
driving experience and health. So, in order to be a safe driver, one must satisfy some 
basic common physiological and psychological requirements. These common 
requirements are the basis of  an evaluation. Procedure of a driver evaluation is 
described in the figure 8.   
Both a driver and driving are hierarchical systems and there are oceans of 
connections between these systems, and in a driver evaluation only a few of them can be 
studied. Therefore it is so important what level of hierarchy of a human being and 
driving activity is chosen for an evaluation. The outcomes of an evaluation depend on 
what levels of hierarchy of a human being and driving performance we take as the 
 95
objects of the examination: an organism and motor operations, a temperament and 
dynamics of cognitive and sensorimotor processes, an individuality and style of life and 
activity, or a personality and goal-directed activity as whole. If  organism and motor 
operations are chose to represent a drivers and driving, as the case often is, then we have 
only deal with biological and mechanical phenomena and laws whereas traffic is first 
and foremost the social form of activity and  social interaction which does not open in 
an organism-operation level. Thus, the methodological decision of the frame where we 
examine the driver has to be made first.  
 
  Figure 8. Prosedure of a driver evaluation.   
 
There are persons suffering from diseases causing functional conditions which 
require a quite a long  observation time until their real ability for safe driving can be 
reliably  defined.  Then  a   process-centred  approach  is  needed.  Diabetes mellitus and 
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sleeping disorders like appnea are examples of those. The question is how and who shall 
make an evaluation. That kind of an evaluation could be quite expensive.  
To some extent a driver can always compensate for lower psychophysiological 
deficiencies by drawing on higher level resources: by anticipation one can compensate 
for reduced motor speed, by judgement one can avoid difficult traffic situations, by the 
active movements of the head a driver can compensate for minor visual field 
deficiencies etc. So, from the point of compensation an examination of the higher-order 
abilities is of most importance. However, permanently lost higher psychological 
functions such as missing judgement, inadequate self-awareness including lack of a 
sense of illness, cannot be compensated for. They all lead to degradation of driving 
performance and often cause abandonment of driving. People with poor executive 
functions generally have reduced adaptive capability.  
The technical possibilities of the compensation are solved on the basis of an 
examination of the condition of a driver’s motor functions. Additional traffic related 
tests and examinations may be required: fine motor tests to find out suitable adaptive 
devices, muscular strength tests for defining the level of the servo, the balance test in a 
sitting position etc.  
For most handicapped persons a car can be  adapted to their physical requirements, 
as our case in point a man who has only one functioning finger in his upper limbs, 
excellently shows. Intelligent transport system technologies such as route navigation 
and intelligent cruise control are coming into wider use, and they can reduce disabled 
persons’ mental load while driving.  
There is a multitude of bio-psycho-social factors influencing safe driving; driving is 
a multisystem object of study. Therefore a multidisciplinary  team evaluation is needed. 
Composition of such an evaluation team could be a (traffic) physician, a (traffic) 
psychologist, an occupational therapist with expertise in adaptive technology, and a 
driving-school teacher. Medical and psychological prerequisites for driving are defined 
by an interview, questionnaires and laboratory tests whereas an evaluation of practical 
ability to drive has to be performance based. Since practical ability to drive is based on 
the behind-the-wheel driving test, the role of the driving-school teacher, as an expert of 
driving performance and education, has to be central to the evaluation team.  
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As we pointed up (IV, V) crucial for safe driving are not perceptible operations with the 
control devices but correct mental actions (object-mental and sign-practical actions) 
which the driver carries out with the help of control devices. Just these higher-level 
mental actions shall be the main subject of the driver’s evaluation. In driver’s 
evaluations we have to take a step away from the testing of the low-order motor operations 
towards higher-level mental actions, and away from concentration in perceptible 
conditions towards identification of the covert personality and cognitive qualities of a 
driver.  
 
 
Figure 7.  Main elements of driving ability. 
 
It is so important to know what motives are behind driving activity. Is a licence 
needed for commuting? The leading activity is anything but a self-evident fact and one 
always has to discover it especially. Pathologically distorted motivational bases of 
activity may lead to prohibition of driving.  
Besides transportation, driving satisfies important social and emotional needs and 
therefore driving and a driver evaluation too, is taken very seriously by road users. 
Therefore an evaluation situation may be emotionally charged. By pass/fail decisions 
experts take an attitude far beyond the actual driving of a car. However, safety 
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The subject of driving activity is the driver but not any of his or her single 
functions, organs or skills. An evaluation of driving ability should be subject-centred 
instead of disease-, handicap- or disability-centred, nor should it be test-centred. In 
driving, all the levels of a human being – an organism, a temperament, and a personality 
including an individuality – are involved. Thus, an evaluation of driving ability is a 
driver evaluation where a driver is considered as a multilevel hierarchical system 
(picture 2). A  person's  functioning  as a driver is conceived as a dynamic interaction 
between levels of an organism, temperament, personality and individuality as the core 
of a personality. In this hierarchy a personality is ‘a formator of a system’ (Judin 1978).  
As mentioned above several times, how well or bad a driver uses his or her potential 
depends on personality factors. The more consciousness is involved in driving, the more 
the driver is the real subject of his or her driving performance and behaviour. Therefore, 
finally driving ability is manifested on the level of a personality which is, in the last 
analysis, responsible for driving safety. The important personality dimensions which 
one has to take into consideration when evaluating driving ability are  ‘balanced – 
impulsive’, ‘responsible – irresponsible’, ‘confident – unconfident’, ‘flexible – rigid’, 
‘mature – immature’, ‘good self-control – bad self-control’.  
Diseases always alter a person’s self-concept and this alteration may also affect 
self-evaluation. Under or overestimation of one’s residual capacity is a common 
phenomenon among disabled persons. In this part of an evaluation the help of relatives 
is most often needed. In a driver’s evaluation of disabled people it is very important to 
examine how the person in question has come to terms with his or her handicap. The 
closed driving test is a good method for an examination of motor functions and to 
examine how well the person has become adjusted to his or her deficiencies and aid 
devices. Generally, the driving simulators and the closed-road tests are proper methods 
for evaluating an operational level of driving performance.  
Safe driving requires that a driver is aware of his or her abilities and restrictions as 
well as the driver has to correctly comprehend traffic situations and conditions. A 
driver’s ability to correctly reflect on his or her internal driving conditions always has to 
be evaluated. The risk for crashes may be moderated by personality qualities and 
higher-order cognitive abilities. However, permanently lost higher psychological 
functions such as missing judgement, inadequate self-awareness including lack of a 
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sense of illness, lack of being able to simultaneously process information etc., cannot be 
compensated for. They all lead to degradation of driving performance and often cause  
abandonment of driving. People with poor executive functions generally have reduced 
adaptive capability. Denial of one’s symptoms is always a significant risk factor for safe 
driving, and may be a criterion for exclusion from driving.  
In activity theory, the concept of action is fundamental. Cognitive qualifications for 
safe driving are defined precisely at the level of actions. Deficiencies in the level of 
higher-level actions, but not operations, most often caused disability. In driving 
performance cognitive functions, especially perception, attention (selective, sustained, 
and divided), vigilance, planning, decision-making, and parallel information processing 
are emphasised. These psychological functions are not considered to be on the 
pathological level.  
Measures of executive functions, which are linked to the skills at higher task levels 
of driving, are essential in evaluations of driving ability. During an evaluation one has 
to determine what a driver’s abilities to plan his or her driving events are, to formulate 
adequate task-goals of driving. Goal formation is influenced by needs and motives and 
therefore goal formation is also often an emotionally charged process.  At the strategic 
level a driver chooses the transport used, decides on a trip and times driving. Tactics of 
driving covers. e.g.. mapping out the route of a trip.  Information about an examinee’s 
planning abilities can be obtained either directly with the help of a driving test or 
indirectly by laboratory tests and an interview. An examinee could be asked, e.g., to 
plan the driving route from point A to point B. The limitations of a driver’s intelligence 
culminates in the strategy and tactics of driving.  
A plan takes shape during driving tasks which a driver solves by mental and 
practical actions and operations. In traffic situations such tasks are, for example, 
obeying driving orders and guidance, regulation of speed, keeping a safe distance away 
from other road users, action at an intersection and junction, action at a pedestrian 
crossing, turning right or left, driving with traffic flow and on the highway, staying in 
and changing lanes, merging, overtaking, and starting/parking/stopping. Tasks 
connecting to one’s own conditions are, e.g., a continuous evaluation of one's own 
driving ability, maintaining a high enough activation level and emotional balance. The 
second question related to actions and operations is: how is the examinee’s mental 
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capacity distributed between operation and actions? Is there enough free energy and 
capacity to carry out higher-order actions or is the capacity bound to lower-order 
operations.  
The decision making process can be balanced or unbalanced in the way of 
impulsiveness or inertness. If the driver’s decision making reaches a pathological level 
of impulsiveness or inertness it causes inability to drive a car safely enough.  
Driving a car is a self-regulative system and the role of self-regulation can hardly be 
overestimated. Safe driving requires especially well functioning self-regulation in all 
levels of regulations. Self-regulation of driving performance and self-regulation of self 
during driving. Safety totally depends on the state of a driver’s self-regulation. The 
problem here is that regulation difficulties appear mostly in unexpected situations. 
Therefore one’s actual ability to regulate driving is difficult to predict and examine even 
using the on-road test because genuinely unexpected and dangerous traffic situations are 
almost impossible to demonstrate due to safety and ethical reasons. A conclusion 
concerning regulative abilities is based on all direct and indirect information that an 
evaluator has on hand.  
 
 
5.2.  Questions for evaluators  
 
Questions which have to be solved in an evaluation arising from the models presented 
above (figures 1. and 7.) are follows: 
 
 What are the examinee’s needs and motives for driving? 
 What is a driver’s leading system in the hierarchical structure of the subject of 
activity: organism, temperament, personality ?  
 Is the examinee able to correctly reflect on the internal and external driving 
conditions? 
 Is the examinee able to correctly plan his or her driving activity?  
 Is the examinee able to carry out proactive actions during driving? 
 How does the examinee master driving related object-practical, object-mental, and 
sign-practical actions? 
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 Is the examinee uncommonly impulsive/inert or sufficiently flexible in his/her 
decision making? 
 Is the examinee capable of making corrections to his or her driving performance 
through a feedback loop? 
 
 
5.3. The point of law: are there significant driving related health  
        restrictions? 
 
In Finnish legal regulations the ability to drive is a medico-legal term which is defined 
in terms of minimal functional  requirements, and in this context ability or disability to 
drive is associated with  defect, disease and  impairments. Thus, in a clinical 
examination concerning legal permission or prohibition to drive a car, medico-legal 
aspects are underlined.  From the point of  view of Finnish law (2006) the question for 
the evaluators is: is there a defect, a disease, or an impairment which significantly 
impairs a   person’s ability to act as a driver? And as to defects and impairments, they 
are most often described only as such lower-order factors as visual acuity, presence of 
seizure disorders and  functioning of the skeletomuscular system.  
 
The explanatory document of the WHO defines the impairment as ‘any loss or 
abnormality of psychological, physiological or anatomical structure or function’, and 
disability as ‘ any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) of ability to perform 
an activity in the manner or within the range considered for a human being’ (WHO 
1980). Impairment includes those parts or systems  of the body which do not work 
properly, and disability centres on those things that people cannot do, primarily basic 
skills of everyday living. Handicap refers to difficulties in carrying out social roles.  
A physical impairment  results from anatomical anomalies or physiological 
dysfunctions which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 
diagnostic techniques. The grounding of the definition of driving ability in health and 
driving disability in the clinical concepts of disease, imapairment, and handicap outlines 
an angle of examination so narrow that the real cornerstones of safe driving remain 
outside of the focus. It falsely assumes a direct correspondence between physiological 
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processes and functional abilities. Physicians can attest to impairment, but they cannot 
identify inability to drive; that is the province of  traffic related on-road and off-road 
researchers.  
Below are some cases when there is good justification to suppose that an examinee may 
have significant driving related restrictions:  
 
- Lack of a sense of illness or his/her sense of reality is distorted.  
- When an examinee’s level of alertness and attentiveness fluctuates considerably 
during the laboratory tests.  
- When driving related laboratory measures of perceptual, frontal and executive 
functions are 2-3 standard deviations below the mean  or below the lower quarter in 
a representative sample of the examinee’s own group, and these deviant functions 
cannot be compensated for by others.  
 
Besides health-related problems there are also other things indicating possibly 
significant problems in driving: 
- Several culpable accidents or near-by-accidents in the recent past have occurred but 
a driver has not learnt anything from the events.  
- When close relatives refuse to ride with an examinee and/or when the close relative 
is an initiator in an evaluation process, this according to our experience, most often 
was indicative of significant problems in driving.  
 
The complexity of the phenomenon of  the ability to drive a car underlines the 
importance of the interplay of social, psychological, environmental, medical, and 
technical factors.  
 
5.4.  Possible sources of bias in evaluations 
 
It is inevitable, that we make errors when judging other people. There are some 
common evaluating errors such as the ‘halo effect’, which implies that the evaluator 
makes multiple generalizations based on one positive or negative characteristic to other 
ones, e.g., an intelligent person is also seen to be more conscientious (Pulakos et al. 
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1986). This ‘halo effect’, as our study with the patients suffering from Parkinson disease 
shows,  is particularly possible in clinical studies carried out without ‘objective’ 
methods. The leniency/severity error means that some people tend to be generally more 
positive while others tend to give more negative ratings. Central tendency errors mean 
that raters only use the midpoints of a scale, rather than the extremes (Guion 1965). 
Finally, the similiar-to-me-error (Wexley and Yukl 1977) occurs when evaluators tend 
to give better ratings when the personality of an examinee is similar to theirs. All these 
common types of evaluating errors may occur in driver evaluations. However, as for the 
driver’s evaluation, there are also some specific types of decision making errors.  
The main type of decision making error in driver’s evaluation can be called ‘an 
error of a level’. This refers to a lack of  a sufficient differentiation between the 
phenomena of the biological, psychological and social subsystems of a human being. 
Natural scientists are prone to consider all human factors depending only on a biological 
or physiological level. In traffic literature there are plenty of studies where driving is 
reduced to an organism-operations level and in this  context only a behaviouristic 
approach is possible. From the point of view of driving ability such  things as a driver’s 
ability to recognise his or her restrictions and strengths, even in principle cannot be 
defined in an organism-operation frame.  
The second type of error, associated with the first one, is ignorance of the higher-
order mediators (inner models, self-concept, motives, attitudes, interests etc.) between 
the factors of the CNS and driving activity.  
The third type of error is connected to the prevailing paradigm to see a human being 
mainly as only a processor of information. Well-functioning cognition is an important, 
but not a sufficient, precondition for safe driving as traffic research involving healthy 
young drivers unambiguously proves. 
Fourth, driving is emotionally charged and this also has an effect on the evaluators 
and the evaluation as well. Emotions may easily  bias results in positive or negative 
direction. Professionalism is lost when an evaluator begins to work as an examinee’s 
counsel for the defence.  
The fifth type of evaluation errors are connected to research methods. The 
limitations of the clinical evaluation were clearly seen in our study with the Parkinson’s 
disease patients (study III). A driver’s evaluation requires special research methods. The 
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common psychological paper-pencil tests and inventories are not driving-related, 
therefore more complicated tests which load, e.g., parallel information  processes are 
needed.  
Sixth, a sufficient difference is not always made between permanent, changing, and 
transient resources and conditions, e.g., acute fatigue may be overemphasised in 
conclusions in the case of  
diabetes. One can avoid this bias by stretching an evaluation over a longer period.   
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6   LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
 
Some methodological limitations of this study should be acknowledged. First, the 
empirical material is relatively limited. Although all the specialists involved in the 
studies were highly experienced, only one specialist was used in each category. 
Therefore more evaluators in each category (clinicians, psychologists, driving 
instructors) should be included in further research.  
 The main concept of the study, an activity, also has a limited field of 
application. Communication cannot be explained in the framework  of activity because 
S-O-relations do not reach interrelations between human beings. S-S-relations cannot be 
explained by actions following each other but the matter is rather in mutual influence 
(Lomov 1984). Actually traffic users continually influence each other directly (blinker, 
horn, headlights, gestures etc.) or indirectly (acceleration, braking, changing lane, etc.). 
Traffic is really the field of interaction, the large system of communication, and without 
a concept of communication it is impossible to properly comprehend a driver's 
performance. However, regardless of the importance of the concept of the 
communication for understanding road users’ behaviour, in the frame of a driver’s 
evaluation most often it is enough to make a rough estimate of an examinee’s emotions 
and attitudes towards other people and traffic rules. 
From the standpoint of an analysis and an evaluation of human activity and 
behaviour, such important factors as psychological defences, identity, role, small and 
large group dynamics and style of activity and interaction, have only been dealt with 
superficially in the study or they are totally ignored.  
The study of the skilled performance and skilled drivers would diversify the picture 
of driving abilities.        
In traffic persons unknown to each other satisfy their needs for movement and other 
needs within the framework of mutually accepted rules. Although a traffic situation is 
supposed to include traffic users it seldom is seen as genuinely interactive and dynamic. 
Subject-subject (S-S) relations open quite a new view compared to subject-object 
relations (S-O) where a driver’s performance is mostly seen as handling of a vehicle and  
traffic situation. An activity is social by its very nature because our activity is always 
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linked to the activities of other people. However,  social interaction in its full extent was 
not the topic of this dissertation.  
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7   CONCLUSIONS  
 
No matter how primitive or how sophisticated techniques are, the resulting judgements on 
driving ability are still only the product of an expert evaluation.  
 
Both drivers and driving activity have a hierarchical structure and in driver evaluations 
it is a question of the matching of these two hierarchical systems with each other.  
 
When evaluating driving ability one has not to reduce driving to a series of elementary 
motor operations nor should a driver be reduced to an organism, a reaction machine, a 
processor of information, to emotions or motives or to a risk calculator.  
 
Safe driving is mainly dependent on higher psychological factors such as self-
awareness, motivation, attitudes, planning, decision making and situational awareness.  
 
An evaluation has to be person centred instead of diagnosis centred. Actually, driving 
ability is manifested in the level of  personality.  
 
The functional system of driving comprises the interactive blocks of the subject of 
activity, reflection of internal and external conditions of activity, planning, decision 
making, realisation of the plans,   regulation of driving activity and feedback. An 
evaluation of driving ability is an evaluation of these blocks.   
 
An evaluation of driving ability includes methods of measurement (mainly at the level 
of an organism), evaluation (at the level of temperament and personality) and 
description (at the level of personality and individuality).  
 
A thorough evaluation must always include the behind-the-wheel test because the final 
conclusion of driving ability or disability, whenever possible, has to be based on 
practical ability to drive.  
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A personality is a continuously changing system with enormous developmental 
capacity, and therefore a personality is the main source of  competence too. Personality 
qualities such as cognitive flexibility, planning capacities and adaptability to internal 
and external changes are important for maintaining driving ability when a driver’s own 
prerequisites are reduced. These qualities are crucial from the point of compensation 
possibilities.  
 
There are no abilities beyond a corresponding activity. Therefore abilities rust without 
practise and in the case of a long interruption in driving a re-educational course is 
recommend. Medical and rehabilitation personnel should more actively recommend 
driving lessons for their clients.  
 
An evaluation of driving ability is a complex, multilevel, and multiphase process which 
can be compared to an evaluation of work ability and this type of  research requires a 
multidisciplinary approach and special expertise in this field of human activity. An 
evaluation requires team-work and the role of driving instructors has to be central in the 
team since they have professional knowledge of driving activity.  
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8   DISCUSSION 
 
The majority of the drivers still would not need any kind of evaluation of driving ability. 
Nor are there problems in conclusions concerning driving ability when there is some 
single exclusion factor like insufficient eyesight, continual attacks, severe neglect, or 
significant perceptual disorders. However, in most cases there is no single exclusion 
factor but several traffic-related constant, changing, and/or fluid factors depending on a 
person’s physical and mental condition. It should be reasonable to use the scanty 
resources for a careful examination of driving ability of potentially problematic persons 
instead of healthy ones. However, there are still no jointly agreed upon criteria for when 
an evaluation by a team of experts is needed. Now it is time for thorough discussion of 
those criteria.  
There is an enormous quantity of studies attempting to explain crash risk by the 
factors of  the low or even by the very low level - simple reaction time, eye-hand co-
ordination etc. --  which even in  principle can explain only a very minor part of a 
driver’s accident risk . Traffic psychological studies lack of a concrete human being 
including all of his or her  needs, motives, attitudes, abilities and deficiencies as well. 
Instead of the whole concrete human being there we meet the abstractions of Man or the 
abstract Men. By the abstractions of Man we mean the way to study a human being 
through narrow operationalised  traits or qualities, and by abstract Men we mean 
selected one-dimensional patient groups. In the real world there are no abstractions of 
the man nor the abstract men behind the wheel, but multidimensional and often also 
multiproblematic persons with their concrete needs and desires.  
Importance of a personality for safety has been underlined for decades. Therefore it 
is astonishing how uncritically the concept of personality is used in traffic literature. 
Generally, one does not even bother to try to define it. There are numerous perspective 
alternatives among personality theories but traffic research seems to stick to the trait 
theory though its limitations and weaknesses are well-known (Pervin 2003). Probably 
the reason that the trait theory is used is because it meets the standards of statistics. In 
traffic research the methods seem to lead the research instead of the methods being 
selected from the subject of the research.         
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As numerous studies show, young healthy drivers as well as elderly drivers with 
cognitive and motor deficiencies, are noteworthy accident risk groups. This clearly 
shows that safe driving depends only partly on biomedical functions and only a minor 
number of accidents are caused by reasons of health. Therefore, one should avoid an 
excessive medicalisation of the evaluation of driving ability. Further, driving is only 
partly a cognitive task and therefore one should avoid neuropsychologisation too.  
Statistical significance, of course, plays an important role when measuring 
sensorimotor and cognitive qualifications of driving ability, but, however, when 
speaking about an evaluation of significant driving related restrictions we are not 
dealing with an absolute scale but the significance has to be evaluated only in a relation 
to some other concepts. One such concept is predictability. One aspect of deviant 
driving is how well or poorly other road users can predict the driver’s decisions and 
performance behind the wheel. Just in this context of a confidence principle we have to 
try to define driving related restrictions and laboratory test results. The predictability or 
unpredictability of one’s driving behaviour always has to be showed, when possible, by 
the on-road test or by an activity based test. The safe driver’s driving performance is 
predictable and predictability of driving means confidence. Thus, the principle of 
confidence is a useful tool in decision making.  
In traffic research there is a lack of such basic psychological concepts as a defence 
mechanism and group dynamics, and partly a role, temperament, self-concept, will, 
need, etc. How can one, for example, examine functional capacity of a chronically sick 
or handicapped person without studying his or her defence mechanism? Of course it is 
impossible. However, in traffic literature one’s unawareness of deficit(s) is almost 
always considered only as a neuropsychological syndrome (neglect) but hardly ever as a 
manifestation of a person’s defensiveness though both organic neglect and emotional 
defensiveness may be equally fatal to road users. Physiologisising of psychology leads 
to naturalism and  along with it psyche disappears from psychology as has happened in 
American and Russian behaviourism at the beginning of the last century. By the 
disappearing of psyche from psychology, we then lose the main regulator of human 
activity and behaviour. It is to say: we lose a human being from the field of research.    
There is a proposal for a pan-European evaluation model with a standardised set of 
tests for assessment (Sommer et al 2003) but this is hardly a correct and appropriate 
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way to organise driver evaluations. First, traffic conditions widely vary in different 
countries as do driving cultures. For instance it is a quite a different task to drive to 
work in sparsely populated northern Finland than in urbanised central Europe. In the 
former case, safe driving primarily requires good vigilance and tolerance of monotony 
whereas in the latter case a divided and selective attention is emphasised. The main 
thing here is to understand what the main question in driver evaluations should be, then 
to standardise an evaluation. There are several correct and valid ways to carry out a 
driver evaluation. Further, a standard is very likely to retard progress in traffic research 
rather than raise the level of the research.  
Individual differences in driving are determined, to a certain degree, by the 
properties of the nervous system, but presently it is unclear how these properties of the 
CNS manifest themselves during driving activity in different situations and driving 
conditions. In theory one could determine the manifestations of the strength-weakness 
parameter of CNS in fatigue, sense threshold, vigilance and attention, and consequently, 
in different traffic situations and conditions as well. This may be a prospective field of 
research.  
A driving licence, regardless of whether we see it as right or privilege, can be 
forbidden only by closely argued evidence. All disabled persons ought to have the 
possibility for a high-quality evaluation of their driving ability. An evaluation of 
patient’s capacity and possibilities to move, including possibilities to act as a driver, should 
be an essential part of a holistic rehabilitation examination. At its best, a driver evaluation 
is a rehabilitation intervention where experts, together with an examinee and, if possible, 
with his or her close relatives, investigate and plan an examinee’s prerequisites and 
possibilities of movement.   
The ability to drive is an individual quality and disability just highlights the 
individuality of a person. Individuality should be more clearly in sight in the terms of 
the licence than it does at the moment. There should be a possibility to stipulate 
different individual conditions for drivers depending on their slight deficiencies which 
do not signify an inability to drive but which may influence driving in certain 
circumstances.  
When a driver’s activity is studied as an individual activity in the ‘driver-car-
environment’ system  and the subject of the analysis is the driver’s actions and 
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operations, then the results of the analysis are perception errors, speeding, too narrow 
safety margins, etc. This is the paradigm. However, though driving a car is a goal-
directed activity, not even the goal of an activity can be understood without an analysis 
of interrelations between individuals because other people have a central role in the 
forming of a goal (Lomov 1979, 1984; Abulhanova-Slavskaja 1980). Traffic is co-
operation and a each driver’s activity depends on others’ activity. In a social interaction 
a communative function of a psyche is highlighted when cognitive and regulative 
functions are more subject-centred. In a social interaction a common goal unifies the 
separated people in the group. A net of  communication, a matrix according to Foulkes 
(1973), transform individuals into a group, individual road users into traffic, i.e., to a 
large group. When driving is studied as communication and social interaction between 
road users then the subject of the research should be group dynamics, communication 
net, style of communication and role-behaviour. Until now this is a poorly studied area 
of research.  
In the last analysis in evaluations of driving ability it is the question of the values 
favoured by the society, and evaluators make value-based decisions when permitting or 
prohibiting someone to drive a car. To put it simply, the dilemma may be formulated: is 
the licence a right or a privilege? Costs of the consequences of false positive decisions 
are high. Thus, a main criterion in decision making must always be a person’s own 
safety and the safety of others. 
Biological, psychological, social and technical approaches all provide unique 
perspectives to the field of evaluation of driving ability. In the next decade the challenge 
of driving ability research is to integrate these many separate foci. 
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Appendix  No 1.  Statistical methods used in the studies 
 
 
Methods                                                           Study 
 
Methods for testing group differences     
Student’s t-test (parametric)   III, IV 
Mann-Whitney U-test (non-parametric)   I, II, III, IV  
z-score      III, IV 
 
Multivariate methods 
 Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficient I, II, III, IV 
 Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient   III, IV 
Stepwise regression analysis   I, III,  
 
Hit rate accuracy  
 Fisher’s P    IV 
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Appendix No 2.  The evaluation methods used in studies. 
 
 
Method 
 
Paper I 
 
Paper II 
 
Paper III 
 
Paper IV 
 
Paper  
 
 
Traffic-related interview 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
 
X 
Willingness to take risk  X X    
Traffic attitude test   X X    
Eysenck's personality test  X X    
Anxiety questionnaire  X X    
MMSE   X   
Hoehn and Yahr scale   X   
Scandinavian Stroke Scale     X  
Barthel index    X  
Self-evaluation of laboratory test   X X X 
Self-evaluation of driving ability X X X X X 
Spouse’s evaluation of driving ability    X X² 
Non-verbal intelligence test X X   X¹ 
Visual short term memory  X X X X X 
Speed and distance estimation X X    
Continuous attention X X    
Vigilance X X X X X 
Flexibility of perception X X X X X 
Simple choice reaction time  X X    
Complex choice reaction time X X X X X 
Information processing capacity X X X  X² 
Driving simulator, tracking test X X    
Isometric strength measure of the limbs ?     X¹ 
Fine motor of the hands ?     X¹ 
Close-road-driving test     X¹² 
On-road-driving test X X X  X² 
      
 
¹ If needed 
² If possible 
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